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SUMMARY 
 
Telecommunication costs in South Africa are among the highest in the world 
today [24]. Using VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) over wireless networks 
offers a feasible alternative, but there are numerous security considerations 
that need to be taken into account when deploying VoIP over wireless 
networks. This study identifies and addresses some of the issues that arise in 
the application layer (the VoIP application itself), as well as some concerns 
with wireless network technologies. 
 
The vulnerabilities are studied in terms of what causes the vulnerability, how it 
can be exploited and what effect exploitation has. Suggestions to remedy 
these potential vulnerabilities are also provided where applicable. The 
vulnerabilities investigated include: buffer overflows, bruteforce attacks, SQL 
(Structured Query Language) injections, denial of service attacks, encryption 
on the application layer, and wireless security. 
 
The study has a strong focus on programming principles, various operating 
systems are used in the study, and networking makes out an important part of 
the work. Although a working system was developed, the majority of work is 
divided into several smaller applications that have been developed to aid in 
researching the mentioned vulnerabilities. 
 
Suggestions towards remedying the vulnerabilities are made where 
applicable, but it is important to note that vulnerabilities are most often merely 
oversight errors. Although the vulnerabilities studied in this work identified the 
most common vulnerabilities, great care should be taken when implementing 
a secure system.  It is crucial to be well aware of what the causes of 
vulnerability are in order to develop a secure system. 
 
Field work was also done by driving around in a motor car with a notebook, 
and plotting wireless network nodes along with some security information on a 
map. Multiple insecure networks have been found which allow for attackers to 
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further penetrate the systems on the network. Some products do not allow 
upgrading of encryption technologies, which leave them vulnerable. There 
are, however, methods to enhance security on the networks without replacing 
the node; hence suggestions towards securing vulnerable wireless networks 
are made where applicable. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Telekommunikasie kostes in Suid-Afirka is van die hoogste ter wêreld op 
hede. Om SoIP (Stem oor Internet Protokol) oor koordlose netwerke te 
gebruik bied „n effektiewe oplossing, maar daar is heelwat sekeriteits 
probleme wat te voorskyn kom wanneer dit so gebruik word. Hierdie studie 
identifiseer en spreuk sommige van die probleme aan wat te voorskyn kom in 
die applikasie vlak (die SoIP program self), asook moontelike probleme met 
die koordlose tegnologie. 
  
Die kwesbaarhede word bestudeer deur te identifiseer wat dit veroorsaak, die 
impak van uitbuiting en metodes om dit te verlig. Voorstelle om die moontelike 
kwesbaarhede op te los word gemaak waar dit van toepassing is. Die 
kwesbaarhede wat bestudeer word sluit in: buffer oorskrywings, brute krag 
aanvalle, SQL (“Structured Query Language”) inspuitings, ontneming van 
diens aanvalle, enkodeering in die applikasie vlak en koordlose sekuriteit. 
  
Die studie het „n sterk fokus op programmeering metodologie, verskillende 
beheerstelsels word gebruik, en netwerke maak „n belangrike deel van die 
studie uit. Alhoewel „n werkende sisteem ontwikkel is, is die grootste deel van 
die werk verdeel in kleiner programmetjies om die navorsing van die 
kwesbaarhede te ondersteun. 
  
Voorstelle om die kwesbaarhede op te los word gemaak, maar dit is belangrik 
om in gedagte te hou dat kwesbaarhede hul oorsprong vind in oorsig foute. 
Alhoewel die kwesbaarhede wat in die studie bestudeer word meeste 
algemene kwesbaarhede identifiseer, moet ontwikkelaars versigtig wees 
wanneer „n veilige sisteem onwikkel word. Dit is belangrik om bewus te wees 
van die oorsaak van kwesbaarhede alvorens „n sisteem ontwikkel word. 
  
Veld werk was ook gedoen deur met „n skoot rekenaar te ry en koordlose 
netwerke te plot op „n kaart saam met verdere sekuriteits inligting. Verskeie 
kwesbare netwerke is opgemerk wat aanvallers sal toelaat om die netwerke 
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verder te penetreer. Sommige koordlose produkte kan nie opgradeer word 
nie, wat dit kwesbaar laat. Daar is tog ander maniere om koordlose netwerke 
verder te beveilig sonder om die eenheid te vervang. Voorstelle sal gemaak 
word om die probleem om te los. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Many people might think that hacking is a recent phenomenon. The truth is that 
hacking has a long history dating from the end of the 18th century. Although the term 
“hacker” was coined later, from its common meaning (gaining unauthorized access 
to a computer system) it started with the advent of the telephone system. The 
switchboard workers eavesdropped on calls and misdirected some. The term 
“hacker” has evolved over time, varying in meaning from someone who knows a 
great deal about computers to those who use computers to commit crimes. Another 
meaning of the word is someone who forces a system to behave in a manner that 
was overlooked or not anticipated by its designer. Today there is a rather large 
subculture practising hacking, but there are many different perceptions of what 
hacking is and its origins. 
 
The Hacker’s Manifesto [3] was written in 1986 by Lloyd Blankenship, also known as 
“The Mentor”, when he was caught for breaking into a system. Here is an extract 
from the writing: 
 
This is our world now ... the world of the electron and the switch, the beauty of the baud. 
We make use of a service already existing without paying for what could be dirt-cheap if it 
wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and you call us criminals. We explore... and you call us 
criminals. We seek after knowledge ... and you call us criminals. 
 
We exist without skin colour, without nationality, without religious bias ... and you call us 
criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try 
to make us believe it's for our own good, yet we're the criminals. 
 
Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what 
they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you, something 
that you will never forgive me for. 
 
I am a hacker, and this is my manifesto. You may stop this individual, but you can't stop us 
all ... 
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When the term “hack” was first coined, it referred to a trick or a way of making 
something do something else it was not intended to do. Some time ago a cereal 
named “Captain Crunch” had a whistle inside the box intended as a promotional gift: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 A Captain Crunch Whistle [1] 
 
John Draper, who later became known as “Cap‟n Crunch”, discovered that this 
whistle can be used to make free phone calls by blowing the correct pitch (2600 Hz) 
and thus simulating money being put into the payphone. Although this does not 
involve computers it was referred to as a hack, as something was used in a creative 
way to make something do something else it was not intended to do. 
 
Because software is written by humans, it is error prone. A software instruction, or 
piece of code, may seem to do something, and it does, but programmers often 
overlook the fact that the instruction (under certain conditions) can do something 
completely different from what the programmer intended. 
 
IPv4 (Internet Protocol version 4) has many great examples of hacks. The Internet 
has grown beyond the expectations of the original architects of Arpanet resulting in 
IP (Internet Protocol) addresses depletion and leading to the development of 
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Network Address Translation (NAT). IP was never intended to be used in such a 
way, but its architecture allowed it. 
 
From this viewpoint, a hacker is someone who likes technology and has a desire to 
make things work in ways different from originally intended. In this work, the term 
hacker will be used from this viewpoint. The term cracker was coined to refer to 
people that use their abilities or skills to break the law and often do not really 
understand what they are doing and use tools written by hackers to break into 
systems. The term “script kiddy” is also used to refer to people who use other 
people‟s tools and exploits to accomplish their tasks, often not having much 
knowledge of what is being done. The meaning of the term cracker later evolved into 
breaking software copy protection so that it can be used free of charge. 
 
Although many hackers prefer not to be categorised, a popular discriminator is 
according to their intentions. “Black hat” is used to refer to someone with ill 
intentions such as malice or criminal behaviour. “White hats”, on the other hand, are 
hackers, who immediately upon discovery of vulnerability inform the vendor of the 
software in an attempt to have the vulnerability fixed. Lastly, grey hats release the 
exploits they developed, regardless of what it will be used for. Although these terms 
are commonly used, their meaning is still highly controversial, even in the computer 
industry.  
 
1.2  VoIP, Wireless VoIP and security 
 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has become a feasible alternate solution for 
telecommunications recently. One of the key advantages of VoIP over the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) is that long distance calls can be made at very 
low costs. Its power can be clearly seen when it is used to phone someone (who 
also has Internet access) anywhere in the world free of charge, as opposed to 
phoning your next door neighbour (although in some countries local calls are also 
free) at a much higher rate. 
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The following is a brief description of how VoIP operates. Firstly, VoIP works by 
having a recording device such as a microphone plugged into a soundcard, which 
captures the audible analogue signals in the proximity of both, or every user in the 
case of a conference call. This analogue signal, or sound, is then digitized and 
stored in a buffer. When the buffer has been filled, it can be manipulated in several 
ways including encryption and compression.  Thereafter the buffer is sent to the 
other host(s) where it is first deciphered if necessary and then played back to the 
other user(s) over a playback device such as speakers. Since multiple users can 
take part in a conversation, and they can speak simultaneously, the system needs to 
make provision for concurrency – which is typically implemented by threads. 
 
Sound naturally exists as analogue waves. These waves can be represented in a 
digital form by means of an Analogue Digital Converter (ADC). An ADC uses the 
electrical voltages generated by the induced current from the microphone to 
generate a series of numbers. These numbers represent the analogue waves‟ 
amplitudes at a specific time. Figure 1.2(a) and figure 1.2(b) show a sine wave as 
well as a digital representation of the wave. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1.2(a) A Sine wave      Fig 1.2(b) Digital representation of a sine wave 
 
As the illustration clearly illustrates, the digital representation (Fig 1.2 (b)) cannot 
reproduce the analogue wave exactly. Some of the quality is lost. The digital 
representation in the above figure allows only seven possible distinct values (the two 
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extreme peaks, 0, and two values in the middle for positive and negative) on the y 
axis. A typical 16 bit sample would allow for 65 536 distinct values, which is a much 
closer representation of the original analogue signal. Another factor influencing the 
quality of the sound is how often a sample is made over time. In the example above 
13 samples where taken. If the period of the wave was one second, the sampling 
rate would be 13 samples per second, and thus require a bandwidth of 208 bytes 
per second on monaural and 416 bytes per second for stereo. 
 
Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) is a well-known standard for sampling analogue 
signals. It samples the signal 8000 times a second and each sample is 8 bits large. 
This results in a 64 kbps bandwidth requirement. Two particularly widely used 
techniques are µ-law (which is used in North America and Japan) and A-Law (used 
in most other countries). 
 
Various audio compression algorithms have been developed to make transmission 
of audio over limited bandwidth networks practical. Audio can be compressed in two 
distinct ways. The first being waveform compression, and the second perceptual 
encoding. With waveform encoding, the aim is to represent the analogue wave with 
as few bits as possible. This can be done by reducing the sample size and/or 
sample rate. The trade-off is of course the quality of the sound versus the size of the 
encoded data. The other compression technique, perceptual encoding, exploits the 
manner the auditory system works. The encoded signal, when played back, sounds 
the same to the human ear, but is in fact something different. It is the same thing to 
the human ear, as it attempts to only having the elements present that fits the 
manner in which humans perceive sound, while the rest is omitted. The PCM 
encoded waveform is passed through an algorithm that filters out elements that are 
inaudible to the human ear.  
 
For a network to carry VoIP optimally, it requires a great deal of tweaking. Jitter 
(when the delay or round trip times of successive packets vary) has a devastating 
effect on VoIP. Streaming applications, including VoIP, rely heavily on a constant 
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transit time. A constant delay time of 10 milliseconds or 500 milliseconds does not 
make a large difference in one-way streaming. It only influences the initial delay; the 
stream continues to flow correctly (in real time) afterwards. A too large delay of VoIP 
is undesirable, as pauses in communication may become awkward and bring forth 
interruptions of speakers/users. High jitter, or a large difference in delay, gives an 
uneven quality to the streamed media and it may become choppy. The following 
figure illustrates high jitter (Fig 1.3(a)) and low jitter (Fig 1.3(b)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3(a) High Jitter    Figure 1.3(b) Low Jitter 
 
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) can add even further complications on 
telephony when jitter is high. Since the input is generated in real time (that is through 
speaking into a microphone), sent across the network, received at the other end, 
and finally played back in real time (at the same speed recorded), a non-constant 
delay will increase the delay over time every time the difference in delay fluctuates. 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) does not have the same problem. It is an 
unreliable protocol and some of the packets may be dropped (when received out of 
order), or may never even be received. On the other hand, when TCP is 
implemented and the application has been designed not to transmit recorded 
“periods of silence”, every time a period of silence occurs, TCP could be used to 
implement VoIP, and prevent the delay from continuously growing larger as there 
are gaps where the delay could be caught up with. VoIP does not require such a 
large amount of bandwidth (if appropriate compression schemes are used), but 
other than that, it is a rather expensive and network resource intensive application.  
Delay 
Amount 
of 
packets 
Delay 
Amount 
of 
packets 
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The PSTN has a huge advantage in terms of security because it is much more 
isolated as opposed to the Internet. Attack vectors are dramatically increased 
through operating over the Internet, as it is much more accessible as opposed to the 
PSTN with its wired infrastructure, or proprietary wireless protocols and encryption 
schemes. 
 
1.3   Statement of the Problem 
 
It is a well known fact that telecommunications costs in South Africa are very high 
[24]. The discontent of the general public about the charge rate is also visible 
through articles, blogs, forums and movements such as the open source movement. 
Since it will be very expensive to lay as many copper lines throughout South Africa 
as Telkom has done during its approximate fifty years of existence, an alternative 
means of networking is needed. Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) may offer a feasible 
solution. Wi-Fi belongs to the 802.11 and 802.11x family of specifications developed 
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) for wireless LAN 
(Local Area Network) technology that specifies an over-the-air interface between a 
wireless client and a base station or between two wireless clients. 
 
Wireless technologies used with VoIP exposes several security issues. Many 
vulnerabilities exist that can compromise the integrity, availability, accuracy, 
authenticity, confidentiality, utility and possession of information. If any of these 
characteristics of information are compromised, the information can no longer be 
trusted. Since information is an important asset, it is crucial to take security 
seriously. 
 
VoIP can be integrated seamlessly on wireless networks, but this introduces several 
major security issues. This research will deal with the security issues that arise when 
using VoIP over a wireless network, but will address wireless network security and 
VoIP security separately. 
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1.4  Motivation for the Research 
 
For the modern business the value of information depends entirely on the 
characteristics (integrity, availability, accuracy, authenticity, confidentiality, utility and 
possession) it possesses. As with timelines (information loses all value if it is 
delivered too late), good information cannot be left without safeguarding these 
defining characteristics. Reliable information needs to be stored, processed and 
transmitted securely. 
 
Since VoIP and wireless networks are potentially insecure technologies, numerous 
vulnerabilities exist. Elevation hacking (exploiting full privileged processes to gain 
elevated privileges) can be used to gain full control of a compromised system, which 
could in turn leave all information on the compromised system untrustworthy. 
 
Wireless technologies encapsulate much more than the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN). PSTN provides enhanced security in the form of physical location 
trace backs (that is each call can be traced back to the physical location of origin 
because wires are used). To break into the system, one would have to physically 
connect to the wired network. This is another barrier that does not exist with wireless 
networks. Conversely, GSM (cellular) networks operate at frequencies for which 
tampering devices are not easily unattainable. 
 
1.5  Research Goals, Objectives and Methodology 
 
Security is obviously a crucial factor in protecting information. This study focuses on 
mitigating the security risks involved in operating VoIP over a wireless network. The 
main objectives of this research are to provide security for both VoIP and the 
wireless network segments. The specific objectives of this research are to 
investigate what causes vulnerabilities, how they can be exploited, what effect 
exploitation has, as well as mechanisms that could mitigate the risks. We do not 
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seek to implement a system that is free of vulnerabilities, but rather provide 
guidelines for designing and implementing a secure system. 
 
As for wireless vulnerabilities we evaluate WEP and WPA-PSK (Wi-Fi Protected 
Access – Public Shared Key). A dedicated host will be set up to detect and attempt 
to decrypt public keys. Because wireless access points generally filter only 
legitimate traffic from passing through a network, a network interface card (NIC) will 
be used to decrypt network keys. The traffic monitoring driver for Windows, 
WinPcap, did not yet support wireless devices at the start of this work. Hence a 
wireless NIC that is supported by Linux was used to detect and decipher wireless 
network encryption. A problem with wireless NICs is that expensive cabling is 
required to attach to an antenna and this cabling and connectors introduce signal 
loss. We will also do field tests by driving around in a motor vehicle and plotting 
every detected network node on a map. 
          Client           Server 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 A simplified VoIP interaction model 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the simplified version of the methodology with which VoIP works. 
The client/server architecture will be on each machine using the VoIP software. The 
Send communications 
request 
Receive packet 
Query user to answer 
and then acknowledge 
Start recording 
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Transmit voice or text 
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Process packets 
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Request socket 
connection 
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client of one machine will communicate with the server of another, and that client will 
communicate back to the server of the other. It is therefore necessary to spawn new 
clients dynamically. This requires a multi-threaded programming environment. 
 
To have practical and usable guidelines and to ensure that VoIP security issues are 
successfully avoided, mitigated, transferred or accepted, exploit programmes will 
also be implemented where applicable and used to demonstrate certain issues. 
They are briefly discussed below: 
 
 Buffer overflows are conditions where the stack is overwritten with user data. 
We will develop an application and investigate how these conditions arise. 
 
 SQL injections involve special delimiters, which allows user code to be 
inserted into (or injected into) SQL statements. We will develop a vulnerable 
application which demonstrates this weakness. 
 
 Denial of service attacks involve a demand of resources which cannot be 
satisfied. A mechanism of blocking such users will be implemented. 
 
 We will be investigating encryption on two levels. The first is the encryption 
used to prevent unauthorized access to wireless networks, and the second on 
a higher level. An application that encrypts and decrypts information sent over 
the network will be developed to demonstrate the encrypted messages.  
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1.6 Organisation of the Dissertation 
 
The organisation of the rest of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, the 
relevant literature will be reviewed. The anatomy of a network attack is presented in 
Chapter 3. Security concerns for operating VoIP over wireless networks are 
discussed in Chapter 4. The implementations and results are presented in Chapter 
5. Conclusions and suggestions of future work are discussed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 
contains the references and Chapter 8 the appendices.  
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2 RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The various well-known security vulnerabilities that arise when using VoIP over 
computer networks are discussed briefly below [17]: 
 
 Brute Force / Dictionary attacks (on Usernames and Passwords) 
Brute force attacks involve the application of computer and/or network resources 
to attempt to try every possible combination of options (characters) of a 
password. If the field of possible accounts can be narrowed down, the success 
ratio increases significantly. Dictionary attacks can be seen as a specialized form 
of a brute force attack. A list of commonly used passwords (known as the 
dictionary) is used to guess with, instead of every possible combination. 
 
 Buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflow exploits have enjoyed popularity recently. These vulnerabilities 
are created by an application error that pushes instructions on the processing 
stack when a larger buffer than compensated for is copied onto the buffer. If the 
overflow section of the buffer is specially crafted, remote code execution is 
possible, but typically results in denial of service. 
 
 Unauthorized access – limited by IP address 
With this type of attack an attacker sends information to another host with an 
alternate IP address indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. 
Usually IP spoofing is used to gain unauthorized access to information or other 
resources. 
 
 Packet sniffing 
A sniffer is a device capable of monitoring information travelling across a 
network. They are virtually impossible to detect and can theoretically be inserted 
 13 
anywhere. The only ways to bypass them is to use another protocol or to use 
encryption with the communications. 
 
 Timing attacks 
Timing attacks include a number of different techniques. They include malicious 
third party cookies, interception of cryptographic elements to determine 
encryption algorithms and keys as well as monitoring response times on 
authorizing messages to determine valid usernames. 
 
 Denial-of-Service attacks 
A large number of requests are sent to a target which renders the target unable 
to handle these requests, as well as other legitimate ones. Distributed denial of 
service attacks involve a number of different systems used together to attack the 
target(s). 
 
A number of mechanisms have been developed to mitigate networks (including 
wireless networks) against these vulnerabilities. Most of these are summarised 
below.  
 
 Encryption 
In order to prevent eavesdropping on traffic, encryption plays an important role. 
Several different encryption techniques and algorithms exist that can be used. 
With wireless networks, the standard is Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP), which 
will be considered in detail in this research. An encryption scheme will also be 
implemented through a text messaging application. 
  
 IP Address filtering 
A security technique known as IP Address filtering can be used to limit network 
access through gateways by allowing only certain IP addresses access. This is a 
viable, but not an entirely secure mechanism, as legitimate IP addresses can 
become available as soon as a network node shuts down. An attacker can then 
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adopt a legitimate IP address. A simple application that accepts connections 
from a list of IP addresses will be implemented to demonstrate its efficiency. 
 
 Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering 
As with IP address filtering, this is another sensible, but flawed mechanism. MAC 
addresses are designed to uniquely identify network hardware and therefore 
create a barrier which disallows unauthorized nodes to access the network. 
However, with the right tools, a MAC address can be changed on a network 
device. This means that if an authorized MAC address is known, access can be 
gained. The mechanism is exactly the same for IP address filtering, but since it 
cannot be changed in some instances (such as some access points) it serves as 
a superior means than IP address filtering. 
 
 Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) Key strength 
WEP uses a key to encrypt and decrypt messages travelling over the network. 
This key is needed by every networked node to be allowed on the network. The 
complexity of this key determines the security of the encryption from the point of 
view of brute force attacks. Obviously (although not always the case), the larger 
the key, the longer it takes to decipher. 
 
2.2 Wireless Network Security 
 
In [4] wireless security is addressed from the perspective that limited computational 
power, limited bandwidth and a noisy channel are taken into account and important 
trade-off decisions are based on that. The proposed security protocol (Point 
Coordination Function) with its algorithm supports these theories. Limited bandwidth 
forces a small number of messages to be exchanged to provide security for this 
model. Limited computational power enforces sophisticated cryptographic methods. 
The noisy environment requires provision for suitable retransmissions, which is 
incorporated. 
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As with all network protocols, a need for standardisation is undeniable in order to 
support the important issue of compatibility. H.323 [16] was developed in 1996 and 
revised in 1998 as a recommendation for VoIP, but was much more of an 
architectural overview than a detailed protocol description. Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP), described in Request For Comments (RFC) 3261, was designed by 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to replace H.323. Unlike H.323, SIP only 
handles the setup of a call through a set of primitives, while H.323 is a complete 
protocol stack. 
 
The work in [17] discusses VoIP security when deployed in unsafe environments. 
When deployed in unsafe environments, the possible attack vectors are numerous. 
Vulnerabilities can be found in the underlying network, the transport protocols, the 
VoIP devices (for example, servers and gateways), the VoIP application, other 
related applications (for example, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, DHCP), the 
underlying operating systems and more. The PSTN‟s security advantage (physical 
character and operation) is also pointed out. Another concern is that voice 
conversation flows over many different physical networks with different interception 
characteristics. 
 
Elementary security principles are discussed within [4]. A variety of attack vectors 
are explained and focus on security in general is applied. 
 
Many concerns for wireless hotspots are discussed in [18].  Although this work is not 
aimed at hotspots in particular, an overlap exists with some of the security concerns 
hotspots face. WEP, although it has its place, is a flawed security measure and 
should not be fully relied upon. 
 
The work described in [19] is mostly concerned with the security issues of mobility. 
The considerations encapsulating seamless roaming along and re-establishment of 
connections are highlighted. Re-establishment problems of Virtual Private Network 
(VPNs) connections are also discussed. 
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Re-authentication is also discussed in [4] and two protocols are proposed that 
provide a clear improvement over Public Key Decryption (PKD). Real time 
applications are able to function with IEEE 802.11 networks. 
 
An in depth study is made on operating systems in [20]. The system architecture is 
introduced and various CPU registers along with their functions and usage are 
explained. As Operating Systems dramatically influence information security, it is an 
important basis of the study. Knowledge of assembly language is necessary in order 
to resolve some of the targeted security threats. 
 
In [9] the workings of buffer overflow exploits are explained. This article describes 
how virtual address space is used, which can be used to achieve remote code 
execution by writing a larger amount of data into an array than compensated for. 
This overflow allows an attacker to manipulate execution flow and can bring forth 
huge bugs. 
 
Novell‟s SUSE Linux 10 has been chosen as an Operating System on which some 
sections of this study will be done.  
 
 A Linux tool for configuring wireless network interfaces (iwconfig) is described in 
[12]. This utility is helpful in putting a wireless device in the desired mode of 
operation. Possible modes include Ad-Hoc (network composed of only one cell and 
no Access Point), Managed (node connects to a network of many Access Points, 
with roaming), Monitor (the node is not associated with any cell and passively 
monitors packets on a channel/frequency), Master (the node is the synchronization 
master or acts as an Access Point), Repeater (the node forwards packets between 
other wireless nodes), Secondary (the node acts as a backup master/repeater) or 
Auto. In order to decipher WEP keys, it is necessary to have the wireless network 
interface in monitor mode. This enables the adapter to receive packets from all 
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networks, not only from the cells it is connected to. When connecting to a network, it 
generally has to be in Ad-Hoc, Managed or Master mode. 
 
Airsnort is a WEP key cracking tool which exploits the RC4 scheduling weakness as 
discussed by Fluhrer. In [21] usage and installation of the tool is described. 
Airsnorts‟ mechanism of cracking WEP will be evaluated against others with 
statistical information. 
 
In [2], VNC, a remote desktop administration utility, usage and installation 
procedures are documented. Because the Linux machine was running on the roof, it 
was difficult to administer it from there. Instead, the freeware edition of VNC was 
used to do so over the network. The merit of this application is that it runs cross 
platform via a web interface and thus easy to use. The remote host can be 
controlled via the network with a mouse and keyboard as if the user was sitting in 
front of the remote machine. 
 
Kismet is another WEP key cracking tool with extended functionality. The manual 
pages in [22] describe its usage. 
 
2.3 Wireless Network Principles 
 
Wireless networks offer an effective means of networking, especially in rural areas 
where terrestrial networking infrastructure is unavailable. VoIP can be operated over 
wireless networks at very low costs, but wireless networks are easily penetrable if 
proper security measures are not used since they are not as isolated as the PSTN. 
This weakness arises because of the way wireless networks operate – over the air. 
Wireless signals are difficult to control and often cover a larger range than is often 
necessary, making them easily accessible to unauthorized use, because there is 
less restriction on physical location. 
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Wireless technologies make use of electromagnetically induced waves. An important 
differentiating characteristic is the frequency of the wave. Different frequencies 
attribute different properties to the waves, such as absorption. The following table 
shows the widely used names of the electromagnetic radio waves according to their 
frequencies. A description of the properties and possible uses of all the other types 
of waves can be found in [5]. 
 
Table 2.1 Electromagnetic waves 
 
Many implementations of wireless networks exist and examples include:  Bluetooth, 
Wi-Fi and Infrared. Bluetooth and Infrared networks are typically arranged in 
Personal Area Networks (PANs), which cover very limited topographical areas. The 
802.11 standard (Developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers - 
IEEE) has three distinguishable subsets: a, b and g. Both the 802.11b and the 
802.11g standards operate at the 2.4 GHz frequency band, while the 802.11a 
standard operates at the 5 GHz frequency. The 802.11b allows up to 11Mbps, while 
the 802.11g standard can handle up to 108 Mbps mainly owing to the differences in 
their physical layer‟s protocol designs.  
 
Electromagnetic Radio Wave Frequency 
Extremely high frequency (Microwaves) 30 GHz – 300 GHz 
Super high frequency (Microwaves) 3 GHz – 30 GHz 
Ultra high frequency 300 MHz – 3 GHz 
Very high frequency 30 MHz – 300 MHz 
High frequency 3 MHz – 30 MHz 
Medium frequency 300 kHz – 3 MHz 
Low frequency 30 kHz – 300 kHz 
Very low frequency 300 Hz - 3 kHz 
Voice frequency 30 Hz – 300 Hz 
Extremely low frequency 3 Hz – 30 Hz 
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A noteworthy characteristic of electromagnetic waves is that the higher the 
frequency becomes, the higher the level of absorption, and the greater the need for 
line of sight between the antennae. Microwave frequencies, where Wi-Fi operates, 
are higher frequencies and require a clear line of sight if the network spans over 
considerable distances. Since 802.11a operates at 5 GHz, which is in the Super 
High Frequency (SHF) band, as opposed to the 2.4GHz 802.11b/g at the Ultra High 
Frequency (UHF) band, while the 802.11a is much more dependent on a clear line 
of sight. 
 
Another important difference between the 802.11a and 802.11b/g standards is their 
channel allocations. The 802.11a standard has 16 non-overlapping channels 
ranging from 5170 MHz to 5805 MHz, while the 802.11b/g standards have 14 
channels with an overlap to adjacent channels ranging from 2412 MHz to 2482 MHz. 
Since some countries have different regulations on which parts of the frequency 
spectrum may be used as well as different regulations on their gain, the 
manufacturers of the equipment tend to manufacture for the most widely used 
specifications. In most countries the 2.4 GHz band is unregulated and can be used 
without a license. Unfortunately, South Africa is an exception. The intentional 
broadcasting of signals over public areas, such as roads, is illegal. Of course, 
signals are hard to control and isolate from spanning across a road. For example, 
the South African law prohibits two devices from communicating when the signal 
spans across multiple properties or public property.  
 
2.4 Wireless Network Security Schemes 
 
The well known proverb that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link is 
especially valid for networks with integrated wireless components. Probably the 
largest problem is that whenever a wireless device becomes part of (or associates 
with) a network, it leaks out data over the air, which can easily be intercepted. If a 
highly confidential VoIP conversation, using only Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) was 
to be operated over a wireless network only the wireless encryption would need to 
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be broken for the whole conversation to be played back in its entirety. It is therefore 
much more secure to add more layers of encryption, for example, encrypting the 
digitised sound at the application layer as well as the wireless network‟s 
communications layer. The digitized voice could for example be encrypted using 
public key cryptography, as it needs to be deciphered at the receiving end as well. 
There are currently two widely used encryption schemes for the 802.11x standard, 
namely Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). 
 
Since wireless networks operate over the air and it is difficult to restrict their 
coverage to a single physical location, it is necessary to encrypt all the data that is 
sent. The first solution was Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) and was supported by 
most of the first generation wireless WEP devices, but this scheme has already 
been compromised. The problem with WEP is that the encryption key used is static. 
(A WEP key as well as a Network Name or Service Set Identifier (SSID) is required 
to connect to a WEP encrypted wireless network). WEP uses a special type of prefix 
(a three-byte array) that is appended to almost every packet. This prefix is called an 
Initiation Vector (IV) and if enough packets are captured, it is easy to determine the 
key through statistical mathematics. 
 
Wireless and wired sniffing are largely the same, interception being easier with 
wireless networks. Sniffing is referred to as a passive attack, as the attacking host 
does not (need to) communicate with the remote host. The remote host does not 
know of the sniffer‟s intention or presence. A few tools have already been written to 
crack wireless networks. Some of the most popular ones are: Airsnort, Kismet and 
Aircrack. Although Kismet can crack WEP, it is more often used as a detection 
and/or site surveying tool. Wireless sniffing is very hardware dependent. The 
wireless Network Interface Card (NIC) needs to support RFMON (Radio Frequency 
Monitoring) mode, or monitor mode. It can be a lengthy process to crack WEP as 
several hundred thousand weak keys or IVs need to be captured before the key can 
be deciphered.  A tool named Aireplay has been developed to speed up this 
process. It captures packets in the air that created weak IVs (typically an 
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association) and resubmits them again, as if it was legitimately sent by the original 
host. This results in faster IV collection and ultimately faster cracking of the key. 
Depending on the type of encryption and some other factors, it can take as little as 
five minutes to crack a WEP key with this type of attack. 
 
The cracking of WEP keys is not an exact science. Sometimes, using Aircrack, with 
sufficient keys can break the key within one second. In some cases, with additional 
IVs, it can take even longer. Any estimate is therefore a rough estimate of how long 
it should take to decipher the key. Below is a table that indicates widely used key 
lengths for WEP encryption. 
 
WEP Encryption Name Hexadecimal Characters Data Byte Length 
64 bit (40 bits) 10 5 
128 bit (104 bits) 26 13 
176 bit (152 bits) 38 19 
256 bit (232 bits) 58 29 
Table 2.2 WEP key sizes 
 
As a general rule the larger the encryption key, the more secure the traffic. This is 
often not the case when other factors come into play such as key strength. Humans 
often want to use easily remembered keys in order to easily enter them on other 
hosts requiring the keys. Another possible problem is found when the key is 
randomly generated by the computer and carried around on a flash stick. The 
weakness lies within limitations of randomness on the generation algorithm. If such 
limitations are exposed one can decrease the possible combinations and thus 
improve chances of successfully brute forcing the key. 
 
History has proven that security should not be supported through obscurity. Secret 
information tends to leak out. It is therefore best practice, with cryptography, to make 
the encryption algorithm publicly available, but to protect the private key. Both WEP 
and WPA-PSK are vulnerable to their keys being discovered. The details on what 
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makes them vulnerable will be discussed in detail later, but for now it will suffice to 
know that cracking the key involves capturing packets. Initiation Vectors (IVs) are 
special packets that are communicated amongst nodes of a wireless network in 
order to associate with each other as an authentication requisite. These packets are 
necessary to break the encryption and a large number of them are required. Since 
wireless networks can operate on several channels, which are at different 
frequencies, many prewritten cracking utilities offer collection of packets from all the 
networks across the channels. Many of them also offer locking to a single channel. 
This increases the collection process for a single network at a single channel, as 
some weak IV might pass by undetected, while the NIC monitors at other 
frequencies. 
 
As soon as an attacker has access to the network, (if the WEP key was deciphered, 
for example) there are several noteworthy attack vectors that will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
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3 THE ANATOMY OF A NETWORK ATTACK 
 
A basic layout of the methodology an attacker may follow, which is commonly 
referred to as the anatomy of an attack, is required before we move on to the 
systems design. This is intended as a guide to aid the understanding of attack 
vectors and should not be used under any circumstances to break into any system 
without authority. It needs to be emphasized that the process is not unrivalled, but is 
only a rough outline with some finer details where applicable. There are many 
additional techniques that can be used for each of the steps, but only a few will be 
discussed to the discretionary of the author.  
 
3.1 Information gathering 
During information gathering as much information as possible is collected. At first 
the information is gathered without regard as to how it is going to be used or how 
it should be structured, but as the attacker gains experience, a feel for what kind 
of information is important is developed. This information includes everything 
related to the target. If the target was a company, for example, information 
ranges from employee details, to the domain name of the company, to the 
external service providers they use. Potentially knowledge about the target could 
be useful, thus one step can often be iterated after reaching a dead end in 
another step. 
 
3.2 Network Probing 
If the target is going to be attacked over the Internet (or over any network), 
probing can reveal much of additional useful information. IP scanning, port 
scanning, WHOIS, DNS lookups, Operating System fingerprinting, retrieving 
information from corporate web sites, sniffing, and service identification are only 
some of the most popular methods. A quick discussion of some of these 
methods, along with a practical example, follows. 
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There are many free port and IP scanners available on the Internet. The basic 
function of an IP scanner is to identify additional hosts on the network. Many of 
these IP scanners follow different techniques to discover hosts. The main 
function of Port scanners is to identify what network services are running, and 
not blocked by a firewall or other device or measure, on each of the identified 
hosts. Nmap [6] is probably the most popular IP and port scanner utility available 
for UNIX-like systems designed specifically to be effective in scanning large 
networks, but it works fine on single hosts as well. Nmap, which is free and open 
source, can also be used for operating system fingerprinting. It makes an 
educated guess on the basis of how packets are treated and the reaction of the 
remote host‟ to certain types of packets. 
 
The following command will launch a SYN port scan on the 192.168.0 subnet 
and even show what type of services were found, as well as the version of the 
programme (if it is detectable and known).  
 
$ nmap –sS –T4 –F 192.168.0.0/24 
 
The parameters‟ meaning can be found in nmap‟s documentation (unlike many 
open source applications nmap is well documented).  The /24 annotation merely 
means that all addresses (1 to 254) will be scanned in the 192.168.0 network 
with a subnet of 255.255.255.0. This annotation is derived from the number of 
bits. As IP addresses are composed of four blocks of eight bit values, the /24 
annotation means that the first 3 blocks of the subnet mask have values of 255 
(8 x 3 = 24). 
 
Netcat and telnet are two other noteworthy tools. It should be noted that we are 
discussing the telnet client, not the protocol. Netcat is well known as the 
“hacker‟s Swiss army knife”, for its power and diversity of usage. It has been 
observed that netcat is to networks as cat is to files, with some extra functionality 
added. Telnet and netcat can be used to manually communicate with a service. 
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The protocol‟s commands can be typed in (if the protocol is text based) through 
the utility. Arguably, the most important and powerful feature for attackers, of 
netcat is its ability to spawn a shell for remote control of the host. Telnet is 
actually a largely deprecated service (because it had plaintext authentication) 
intended for remote control and replaced with the more secure ssh, but its client 
is often included with Operating Systems to aid troubleshooting. The following 
netcat command listens for a connection on port 23 and gives a shell to the 
connecting host, which means that one can work on a remote machine as if 
sitting in front of it by telnetting to the socket. 
 
$ nc –e “/bin/sh” –l –p 23 
 
DNS lookups are used to identify more target hosts related to the target. WHOIS 
[7] is a tool that queries a publicly accessible database of registered domain 
names. It can reveal information such as the organization‟s location, its domain 
name, contact persons along with their contact details, and the subnet of the 
organization. Although this might sound somewhat useless at first, this can be 
very helpful to attackers who find themselves at a dead-end with usernames and 
passwords.  
 
Alternatively, there are some security auditing tools such as Nessus and GFI 
Languard that combine this step along with the following step (Vulnerability 
Assessment). It then creates a report of all vulnerabilities found and suggests 
solutions on how to fix them. Almost needless to say, the trade-off between 
manual scanning and these assessment tools are convenience versus 
thoroughness (if the auditor is competent in doing so). 
 
3.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
Once the attacker has sufficient information about the target and probed its 
network, he can start identifying weaknesses, or possible entry points. This 
depends on what the attacker wants to accomplish. If, for instance the attacker 
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wants to deface the web site, it would probably be best to first look for 
vulnerabilities within the web service. If an administrator login page is available 
along with an SQL injection vulnerability (SQL injections are explained in chapter 
4), the task is straightforward. One can even use search engines for this 
purpose. When searching for “Admin” “Login” on Google, many hits are found 
and it is shocking how many of these web pages are not protected against SQL 
injections. On the other hand, if the attacker is after sensitive data, he might want 
to try and guess, or use brute force to attack the username and password of an 
FTP account.  
 
This is where the information obtained during information gathering comes into 
use. Some employees may use their own names as usernames and some other 
phrase as their password, such as their date of birth, or their child‟s first name. 
This practice is quite common, even though password strength is repeatedly 
emphasized in at companies with sensitive data.  Creative attackers may even 
go through the garbage of a company in order to obtain some useful information. 
If the attacker is not after sensitive data, or defacing the company home page, he 
might want to obtain complete control over the system, and maybe escalate the 
attack to other systems on the network as well. This is usually done by looking 
for additional weaknesses in the services running on the target hosts. After 
identifying the services, an attacker can further identify the service version, and 
check whether there are known vulnerabilities of the service. Alternatively, many 
programmes are open source, which means that the source code is available for 
inspection by the attacker. The attacker then needs to obtain a copy of the code, 
read it, find a vulnerable piece of code, and exploit it. After the vulnerabilities are 
known, the attacker can try to penetrate the vulnerable systems. 
 
3.4 Launching the Attack (Penetration) 
It will be more efficient to first check on the Internet whether there are already 
existing exploits that the attacker may use to accomplish his task. Two of the 
best databases are the metasploit framework and milworm. The metasploit 
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framework is a framework designed to aid the research of exploits. Contributors 
make their exploits available to others in the hope that they will be educational. 
Millworm is another such database, but in contrast to metasplot, it is not a 
framework, and more of a host for source code of exploits written in natural 
programming or scripting languages.  
 
The main difference between the two is that metasploit has its own „language‟ 
and „modules‟. Often, attackers may find that there is no full disclosure or proof of 
concept available on the Internet for the sought vulnerability. It is often here that 
the difference between the hacker and the script novice becomes apparent. In 
order to be dubbed an “elite hacker”, one needs to have extraordinary 
programming skills additional to the preceding knowledge. In Chapter 4, we 
discuss buffer overflows in detail where it will become clear that quite extensive 
knowledge is needed in order to successfully exploit this type of vulnerability. 
 
3.5 Privilege Escalation 
It has become common over recent years for operating systems to support 
several user accounts all of which have their own predefined privileges. When a 
service has been exploited, and typically this involves having remote access to a 
command prompt, the privileges of the attacker are that of the user account 
running the service. It has therefore become a common security practice to run 
services with limited privileges. This does not necessarily prevent the attacker 
from gaining full privileges, but it creates an additional barrier and is therefore 
justifiable. Gaining elevated privileges is not limited to what is discussed here, for 
example, two of the most common methods are to try and recover, or break 
usernames and passwords, and to exploit another weakness. An example of the 
latter in UNIX-like systems would be to overflow the buffer of a programme that 
takes a parameter value with the SUID (Super User ID) flag set. These 
programmes are common in the UNIX environment. In Windows XP, a possible 
command would be: 
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C:\> at 13:00  /interactive cmd 
 
This spawns an interactive command terminal with System privileges and a title 
of svchost.exe, the highest privilege in the Windows environment, even higher 
than Administrator, at the specified time. It is therefore wise to specify the time 
one minute into the future of the compromised machine. Since the “at” command 
is owned by the System user the newly launched scheduled task still belongs to 
System. Again, a simple side-effect was overlooked. If a remote desktop service 
is available and logged into, this can be used in to run the graphical mode with 
System privileges as well simply by opening the Task Manager, ending the 
explorer.exe process, and running explorer.exe again within the svchost.exe 
shell. 
 
After successful privilege escalation, the attacker is free to do with the system as 
he pleases. If the attacker is malicious, this could severely impact the victim, 
from disclosure of sensitive data, sabotage, to losing all the data on the 
compromised system. 
 
3.6 Maintaining Access 
Good security principles not only suggest, but demand that systems must be 
kept up to date by applying appropriate patches and updates on a regular basis. 
If an attacker needs to stay in control of a compromised system, they usually set 
up a backdoor or make use of a rootkit to maintain access to the host. These 
programmes can also be present with phenomenal stealth, so much so that the 
user or antivirus software may be completely unaware of its presence. It is thus 
wise to manually check from time to time for the presence of such software. The 
methodology to do so however is beyond the scope of this research. Useful 
information can be found in [8] and [23]. 
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3.7 Stealth mode - Covering Tracks – (editing logs) 
Since the attacker needs to connect to the compromised system, and probably 
generates much traffic, especially in the case of a brute force attack, chances are 
that his activities might have been logged in several different ways. One of these 
methods might be an intrusion detection system (IDS). Another method might be 
as close as the command prompt. The Linux bash shell logs all the commands 
issued. This is useful for many reasons, including pressing the up arrow to 
traverse through previously executed commands. As usual there are ways 
around this for the attacker, such as editing his log entries. Linux commonly 
stores bash‟s logs in /root/.bash_history as plain text. It is thus easy for the 
attacker to simply delete the lines of the commands he issued when he is done, 
leaving it exactly as it was for the user. Specialized log cleaners also exist to 
automate these tasks. When network traffic is logged, there are also a few other 
work arounds, such as making use of an anonymous proxy, which hides the IP 
address of the attacker from the logging systems of the victim. 
 
3.8 Radio Network Intrusion 
The problems with wireless security have already been discussed, but it has not 
yet been properly put into perspective in terms of where it fits in. How to retrieve 
a WEP or WPA-PSK key has already been discussed. This step could actually 
have been added to the top, for getting on the corporate network, but it is 
discussed here as it is not the only method to gain access to the network, and 
not all corporations employ (vulnerable) networks. When an attacker successfully 
compromises the wireless network‟s encryption, there may again be many 
additional fortification layers. Probably one of the largest benefits for an attacker 
being able to break into a system from the wireless network is the added 
anonymity. If the attacker faked the MAC address of his NIC prior to breaking 
into the system, the logs generated by his actions do not uniquely identify the 
attacker, or the hardware that was used. In order to identify the culprit, the 
attacker needs to be either recorded by means of surveillance or physically 
caught while he is in the act. The attacker may be sitting in a building across the 
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street, or more than a block away, which almost completely rules out both 
methods. It is thus extremely difficult to obtain incriminating evidence to an attack 
from this vector. 
 
Table 3.1 depicts some of the common exploitable software vulnerabilities with a 
short description of each. 
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Weakness Description 
Buffer Overflow Buffer overflows have recently become very popular. Buffer 
overflows are caused by writing a larger piece of data into an 
array or buffer than was provided for, leading to memory 
corruption. The main problem with preventing buffer overflows 
from happening is that array bounds need to be checked at 
runtime, which is a performance drawback. 
Format Strings Very similar to SQL injections, this vulnerability is produced 
through unexpected special characters input by a user. A 
typical C programme may read in a string to a character array 
from the user and print it out to standard output. If the user 
was to type in some special characters, the programme will 
treat them as the tokens they represent, for example if “%s” 
was input, another string will be expected as parameter in the 
printf statement. 
Race Conditions A case where the order of instructions or events, and in the 
majority of cases as a side-effect of improper file locks, can be 
exploited to behave in a non-anticipated way. A common 
exploitation example (with file locks) is to gain access to other 
user‟s accounts through the passwd programme in UNIX-
systems by using symbolic links. Semaphores address this 
problem produced by the introduction of multitasking in 
Operating System design by implementing a critical region. 
Integer Overflow Although integer overflows are much more difficult to 
successfully exploit and almost requires a special case to be 
useful, it is a noteworthy vulnerability found in popular 
language implementations. The main concern is what value is 
assigned to a variable when the value to be assigned is larger 
than allocated for an integer whether it is 16 bit, 32 bit or 64 
bit, or whatever size. An unsigned 16 bit integer can hold no 
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larger value than 65535 for example. 
Cross-site scripting Typically found in web applications, attackers exploit a web 
server that does not limit pages‟ elements to the local server. 
This remote page, which might include malicious code, is then 
viewed by users visiting the site. The intent is usually phishing 
that is, pretending to be someone else, and using the 
gathered data input from the user (which might be a 
username and password of a user‟s bank details) malignantly.  
SQL injection SQL injections involve a special character (the single quote) 
being input by an attacker to confuse the parsing of arbitrary 
code as SQL statements. SQL injections are most commonly 
used to gain unauthorized access to administrative consoles 
of websites. SQL injections as well as format string attacks 
can be categorized under code injection exploits. 
 
Table 3.1 Common exploitable software vulnerabilities 
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 The explanation of the anatomy of an attack is important because it makes it 
easier to explore the different countermeasures that may be devised to mitigate 
against attacks in the next chapter. It is important to note that security measures 
should be seen as trade-offs between cost and the level of security. Risk 
analysis should therefore be conducted in order to assure that the security level 
matches the company profile. It is senseless to secure a system with the latest 
technology when that level of security is not necessary at that cost, and vice 
versa. 
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4 SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE WIRELESS VOIP SYSTEM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we discuss some of the common vulnerabilities that are possible in 
our system that is presented in Figure 4.1. It is crucial to first fully understand the 
cause of the vulnerabilities; the effect exploitation has as well as the solutions to 
them, because as was stated earlier, vulnerabilities are often oversight errors or 
unanticipated special cases. The attack vectors and security measures investigated 
include buffer overflows, brute force attacks, SQL injections, denial of service 
attacks, sniffing and encryption techniques. With wireless encryption, two different 
encryption techniques that are widely used in practice, namely WEP and WPA are 
investigated. Demonstrational exploitable applications were developed in order to 
demonstrate the different types of vulnerabilities (they are available on the disk 
attached to the back cover of this dissertation). The design flaws of these vulnerable 
programmes, or code snippets, are discussed in this chapter and the results are 
presented in the next chapter by showing their exploitation. 
 
4.2 The Wireless VoIP System 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts the workings of each node of the VoIP System. Although the 
system is medium independent and can be operated over both wired and wireless 
networks, a wireless network, which could be penetrated, is assumed. 
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          Client           Server 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The VoIP model 
 
The system has both a client and a server, which connects to the other hosts 
with which a conversation is in progress. Figure 4.1 (included again for 
readability) best describes a conversation to the local host. The server section 
(which runs in its own thread to allow concurrency and multiple calls) listens on a 
port, awaiting a client to connect to it. 
 
When the server detects that a client has connected to the network socket, it 
accepts the connection and network communication may commence. The client 
detects that the connection is established and sends a request to the server to 
initiate a voice call. Upon receiving this request, the server prompts the user to 
take the call. 
 
If the user declines the call, the client is notified and the connection is terminated 
to free up resources. If, however, the user decides to take the call, the server 
spawns a new client that will record microphone input and send the speech to 
the server on the other node, and acknowledge to the client that the call may 
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proceed. When the newly spawned client connects to the server of the remote 
machine it detects that it is already in conversation with the other host and this 
prevents it from spawning a new client again and causes an infinite loop. The 
server merely accepts the connection (without prompting the user again to 
accept the connection). 
 
Both clients thereafter start recording and buffering microphone input. The 
encoded voice is then sent to the remote server which decodes it and plays back 
the speech over the speakers. 
 
4.3 Vulnerabilities 
 
4.3.1 Buffer Overflows 
 
Buffer overflows, although limited to the C and C++ programming languages, are 
important to consider as current and future VoIP implementations may be written 
in this popular language and buffer overflows are probably the most exploited 
vulnerability. It is important to note how a process, or an application, is organised 
in memory, before we delve into the details of buffer overflows. 
 
 
Text region 
 
 
 Data region 
 
 
Stack region 
 
         
Figure 4.2 The constituents of a process 
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There are three major distinguishable parts of a process map as shown in Figure 
4.2: the text region, the data region, and the stack region. We describe the first two 
parts and a description of the last part is given later.  The text region contains the 
instructions compiled by the compiler. This region is fixed, and any attempt to 
overwrite it will interrupt execution and raise a segmentation fault. The data region 
on the other hand contains static variables, which are writeable. Details of memory 
management and the Virtual Address Space (VAS) are described in [9]. A stack is a 
very popular data structure used in programmes supporting several operations, 
including PUSH, POP and PEEK. Stacks follow the “Last In First Out” (LIFO) 
scheme. The stack expands and collapses at runtime as execution of the 
programme continues. Most high-level programming languages have support for 
functions, which temporarily alter the flow of control by executing a different set of 
instructions located at another memory address, and thereafter returns control to the 
instruction following the function call. This flow of execution is implemented at a low 
level by means of the stack, although it is not the only function of the stack.  
 
The processor contains registers, which is an important aspect of this discussion. 
Registers vary from manufacturer to manufacturer as well as model to model. For 
this work a 32bit Intel-x86 processor is assumed. Processors contain user-
accessible registers, which are addressable during application programming, and 
programme inaccessible registers, which cannot be addressed directly, but may be 
addressed indirectly through system programming. Some registers are general-
purpose while others are used for special purposes. 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit registers 
are allowed to be referenced. The 8-bit ones are AL, AH, BL, BH, CL, CH, DL and 
DH (The L indicates the “Low” and the H the “High” order bits. A through to D are 
sequential numbers to distinguish between the registers). The 16-bit registers are 
AX, BX, CX, DX, SP, BP, DI, SI, IP, FLAGS, CS, DS, ES, SS, FS, and GS. Finally, 
the extended 32-bit registers are EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESP, EBP, EDI, ESI, EIP 
and EFLAGS (the “E” prefix indicates that it is a 32-bit register). The noteworthy 
registers are the general purpose registers (EAX through to EDX), EBP, which are 
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often used to point to a memory location for data transfers, and EDI, which is often 
used to point to the destination address of an operation. The important special 
purpose registers are EIP, which is used to point to the next instruction (within the 
instruction segment) to be executed, and ESP which is used to point to the stack. 
 
There are two important registers we need to consider with respect to stack 
operations: the Stack Pointer (SP), which points to the top of the stack, and the 
Frame Pointer (FP) (EBP on 32-bit Intel architectures), which points to a fixed 
location in a frame. The FP is used by many compilers to keep track local variables‟ 
and function parameters‟ memory addresses, as the relative distance between FP 
and the variable is not influenced by PUSH and POP stack operations.. The base of 
the stack (where the remaining firstly pushed element is located) is at a fixed 
memory address. Depending on the implementation, the stack expands (as 
elements are pushed onto the stack), and therefore changes the value of SP, either 
downwards (towards lower addresses) or upwards. On the Intel processor, the stack 
expands downwards, therefore the demonstrations in this work are presented in 
such a way. Multiple instructions are executed both during a function call, and during 
its return. A simple stack example follows in Figure 4.3, which is similar to the self-
exploiting demonstration “bof.c” included on the disc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 A Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Example Code 
 
vovoid calledFunction(string param) { 
 char arrString[3]; 
 strcpy(param, arrString);  
}}} 
} 
} 
 
vovoid Main() { 
 string x = “xyz”; 
 calledFunction(x); 
 printf(“x = %s“, x);} 
}}} 
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The assembly code for the above listed programme is then compiled. Details of the 
assembly code will not be discussed here, but it is important to note that when 
calling the function (calledFunction) that the value of the FP (EBP) is PUSHed onto 
the stack. Thereafter, the value of the SP is copied into the FP, rendering the current 
top of the stack as the FP value. Additional space for local variables is then 
allocated by first determining the required size. This is done by taking their size and 
subtracting (for downward expansion of the stack, added for upward expansion) it 
from the SP.  
 
It is important to note that the word size plays a crucial role in addressing memory, 
as it can only be addressed in multiples of the word size. A 32 bit or 4 byte 
architecture was used for this work. Since the 32 bit (four byte) architecture was 
used, the buffer sizes will be in multiples of 4 bytes. For example, a 16 byte buffer 
will take up 16 bytes of memory (4 x 4 bytes), a 32 byte variable 32 bytes and so on.  
It is important to note, however, that a 5 byte buffer (or a 5 element array) will 
actually take up 8 bytes in memory, when using a 4 byte (32 bit) architecture since 
this is the smallest possible buffer size in a 32 bit (or 4 byte) architecture that can 
accommodate 5 bytes. The following allocated variable will start at the next multiple 
of the 4 byte offset. A sketch of the example code is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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buffer2 
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Figure 4.4 Memory allocation at runtime 
 
A question that one may ask is: “Why not simply send a large amount of junk that 
will overflow the buffer?” This is indeed a valid question. If the buffer is simply over-
flown without taking care what is overwritten, the programme will most probably 
crash and make a core dump. On the other hand, if a buffer overflow is done in a 
very precise and calculated way, it becomes possible to execute arbitrary code, 
which is not even inside the programme. What an attacker usually does is to craft a 
special payload, also known as shellcode, which is sent to the application (possibly 
over the network) and which overflows the buffer. Since the targeted buffer is of a 
certain size, and also a specific number of bits away from the return address, which 
is the target to be overwritten, the payload needs to be extremely precise.  
 
It should be noted that the payload will stretch from the overflowing buffer‟s address 
up to the return address, and that this block should be viewed as a contiguous 
Address top 
Address bottom 
Stack top 
Stack bottom 
 41 
memory section, although it is actually allocated to several variables. In this case the 
shellcode will consist of a continuous series of NOP (no operation) instructions (also 
referred to as a NOP slide), the instructions to be executed, as well as a guess at 
the wanted return address (which should point somewhere inside the NOP slide). 
The NOP slide is a series of no-operation instructions deliberately added to the 
shellcode in order to make it easy to guess the correct return address. The 
overwritten return address can point to any region from within the first NOP 
instruction, up to the last one, just before the first arbitrary instruction. The content of 
the section in between the last instruction, which is usually an exit call, does not 
really matter, only the size matters, so that the exact address of the return address 
can be overwritten effectively, pointing it towards the arbitrary instructions.  
 
Although shellcode is a very important part of exploiting a buffer overflow, it will not 
be discussed further, since information regarding shellcode is abundantly available 
on the web. Some even include pre-compiled shellcode which can be used on 
various platforms. A tutorial on writing shellcode can be found in [9]. 
 
We developed a sample programme with a buffer overflow vulnerability that exploits 
itself and is included as “bof.c” on the disk. Consider the code in Appendix A for the 
following discussion of this programme. The global variable shellcode is used to 
store the instructions to spawn a shell ($/bin/sh), which was obtained from 
metasploit. The main() function is invoked as soon as the programme starts 
executing. Thereafter the function named function() is called. As was mentioned 
earlier, the important thing to note is that at a lower level, a return address is pushed 
onto the stack telling the processor where to return execution flow when the function 
is completed (which is at the line below the function call and, in this case, the end of 
the programme). As execution is passed to the called function, two character arrays 
are declared as well as an integer pointer named *ret. This pointer will be used to 
get a handle to the return address and ultimately change its value. We get the return 
address‟s location in memory by some simple math. Because we have addressable 
locations in memory (the arrays‟ addresses), and we know that the return address is 
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stored in a location within a certain offset from the function‟s local variables, we can 
assign the pointer to point to the address of the return address and ultimately 
change its value to whatever we want. In our example we simply set its value to the 
address of the shellcode variable, so that execution is passed to that address when 
the function terminates. This spawns the shell by issuing the command contained 
within the shellcode variable ($/bin/sh). 
 
Most other languages avoid this issue by bounds checking memory transactions. 
Whenever a read/write attempt to an illegal memory location is detected the 
application‟s execution is terminated. As this needs to be done at runtime, it is of 
course a performance trade-off. 
 
4.3.2 Brute Force 
 
Although we did not devise and implement strategies to mitigate against brute force 
attacks, it is a commonly used attack and therefore deserves to be investigated what 
it is and how attacks are expected to be launched. Brute force attacks are mainly 
concerned with guessing correct usernames and passwords. An attacker would 
most likely write a small programme that understands the authentication section of 
the relevant protocol. The programme will automatically cycle through username and 
password combinations until the correct one is guessed and then log in using this 
correctly guessed username and password.  There is a tool named Brutus [10], 
which supports a large variety of protocols that can be used to make a brute force 
attack against supported protocols. These attacks often take on specialised forms 
such as wordlists or dictionary attacks where the attacker cycles through popular 
username and password combinations rather than trying every possible key 
combination. This drastically scales down the number of attempts and therefore the 
time it will take to break the authentication (assuming the username and password 
combination is on the list).  
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Strong passwords are an alternative solution attempting to solve the problem by 
leaving the burden of remembering a difficult password with the user. Although it 
might seem like a reasonable solution, users who are told not to base their 
usernames and passwords on English words and that they should contain numerals 
as well as alphabetical characters, usually use some name (typically their own or 
their spouse‟s) and a concatenation of numerals such as “1234”. This can indeed 
result in strong passwords, if the attacker is using an English dictionary, for example, 
to crack the username and password. 
 
Mutnick‟s book “The art of deception”, which has a strong focus on social 
engineering suggests that the user is the weakest link in the security of most 
systems [11]. They are easily deceived into entrusting an unauthorised person with 
classified information such as a username and password. It would therefore be best 
for a user to have as little as possible to do with authentication. This in turn can be 
solved through storing this information on the user‟s computer, but it is unfortunately 
at the cost of mobility. It is therefore desirable to suggest, or perhaps even enforce, 
a sensible password policy by forcing the user to specify a password based on a 
secure regular expression. Care should be taken with such an expression, as a 
single wildcard out of place can drastically influence the possible number of 
combinations or produce other detrimental effects that compromise security. Since 
the SIP standard is implemented, and no central server has been implemented, a 
temporary workaround which will store user credentials has been made for purposes 
of completeness of our VoIP application. It is completely unacceptable practice to 
store others‟ usernames and passwords on potentially distrusted sources (that is on 
an unencrypted local file on the client‟s PC). 
 
4.3.3 SQL Injections 
 
To illustrate how common SQL injection vulnerabilities are, one can search for the 
string: „inurl:.co.za “Administrator” “Login”‟, excluding the single quotes, with Google 
and it will return all the hits of Administrative login consoles with a “.co.za” extension 
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indexed by Google. The results returned will contain a listing of all South African 
business domains‟ web login consoles. One can then try to just insert a single quote 
into either the username or password fields, and when this generates an error 
relating to a SQL query, the chances are that the site is vulnerable to an SQL 
injection. This is one of the most common methodologies for defacing websites. It is 
surprising how many vulnerable sites there are on the Internet, as a company‟s 
homepage contributes largely to its public image. 
 
Imagine a web site development company whose website was defaced. One would 
not entrust such an organization with your own website if they are unable to uphold 
their own. It is far from uncommon to see defaced web design websites, which again 
points to oversight errors. This may be one of the greatest reasons companies tend 
to be secretive about their security status. Many reports have shown that 
organizations deny that their websites were defaced, as they are only interested in 
resuming business rather than bringing the culprits to justice.  
 
Consider the pseudo code in Figure 4.5. 
 
recordSet result; 
result = SQLobj.execute(“SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME = „ ” + 
user_supplied_username + “‟ ;”); 
If (!result.isEmpty()) { 
 call LoggedIn(); 
} 
else { 
 call accessDenied(); 
} 
 
Figure 4.5 SQL injection illustrative sample code 
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Firstly, an SQL query is executed against a database and the record set of all the 
records are stored in the recordset variable. Since the “USERNAME” field in the 
“USERS” table in our example is the primary key of the table, the record set will 
either contain one entry or be empty. After execution of the SQL statement, the 
result is evaluated for being empty. Thereafter the appropriate function is called to 
either notify the user that he is logged in, or that access is denied. In this example 
“user_supplied_username” is a string which was typed in by a user wishing to log 
into the system. If the user supplied a string such as 
 
anything‟  OR ‟1 ‟  = ‟1  
 
for the username, the SQL query‟s semantics drastically changes. The query will 
read as follows: (note that the “user_supplied_username” was replaced by its value. 
It is highlighted below to clarify.) 
 
“SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME = „ ” + “anything‟  OR ‟1‟  = ‟1 ” + “‟ ;”  
 
And now the statement is given as it is passed to the database management 
system: 
 
“SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE USERNAME = ‟anything‟  OR ‟1 ‟  = ‟1‟ ;”  
 
What happened was that the SQL code was injected into the statement – hence the 
name SQL injection. Since the OR operator needs only one of its operands to 
evaluate to “true” in order to execute its command (selecting a username, which is 
done in a loop), the query successfully executes, listing every “USERNAME” in the 
“USER” table, because 1 is always equal to 1. Furthermore, the evaluation of the 
recordset being empty thus takes a different route. Rather than being empty – for an 
incorrect username supplied it holds a whole set of records. It thus satisfies the 
evaluation of not being empty and passes execution onwards to the successful 
login. 
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Apart from an attacker using SQL injections to log into a system, other arbitrary code 
can be executed in conjunction. If another semicolon was injected to delimit the end 
of one statement and the beginning of another, a whole different dimension of 
attacks against the database opens. A malicious attacker could inject a drop table, 
or drop schema statement, or replace important data with garbage, corrupting the 
database. 
 
A sample programme named “SQL.exe”, written in Visual Basic 6, was included on 
the CD to demonstrate the effect of SQL injections. We refer to the code in Appendix 
B in reading the following discussion of the code. The sample depicts a typical user 
login example where the user is presented with a prompt to supply a username and 
password to log into the system. The problem with the programme is that it fails to 
check for and take appropriate action against a delimiter. When a single quote is 
given somewhere in either the username or password fields, the input afterwards is 
treated as SQL code. This will most likely lead to a malformed SQL statement, but if 
care is taken to inject the correct code, a positive login is possible without a valid 
username and password. We can remedy this issue by searching for and handling 
special delimiters such as single quotes before concatenating user-input to SQL 
statements passed to the DBMS. 
 
4.3.4 Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service (DoS and DDoS) 
 
As with bruteforce attacks, no measure is implemented as a part of this work, but we 
attempt to broadly outline the concerns faced with DoS and DDos attacks. Denial of 
service attacks encompasses a large number of requests sent to a target which 
renders the target unable to handle these requests, as well as other legitimate ones. 
An attacker executing this type of attack is generally interested in having the remote 
server deny service to everyone else, including legitimate traffic, and may use a 
wide variety of techniques to keep the server application/thread too busy to respond 
to any other queries. These methodologies may range from making a connection 
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and immediately dropping it in a loop, sending large amounts of junk that must be 
processed, or even keeping the user busy with senseless conversation so that the 
user is unable to take any other calls (which is more of a social engineering and 
denial of service combination). In order to identify a denial of service attack, one 
needs to monitor some variable being repetitively changed, while some other criteria 
that make it associated with the same attack remains the same. 
 
Devising defence mechanisms for this type of attack poses major challenges.  For 
example, limiting the number of connections in a specific time frame from a certain 
IP address is a possibility, but unfortunately only as long as the attacker does not 
know that it is his IP address that has been blocked. An attacker could create a 
script that opens a connection, closes it and then changes his IP address, all in an 
infinite loop, rendering this solution ineffective. The same principle is applicable to 
MAC addresses and any other variable the attacker can alter. It is therefore 
problematic to link several connections to a single attacker and properly block the 
attack attempts.  
 
The situation outlined above is hypothetical, though everything mentioned is 
possible when operating over a LAN. Changing an IP address on the Internet is 
much more troublesome (depending on the method by which one is connected to 
the Internet). Virtual private networking (VPN) is another possible solution, which 
excludes unauthorized parties from gaining access to the application layer. If the 
attacker is not “on the same network as the target”, he cannot launch an attack. 
Also, the connection speed (especially over the Internet in South Africa) may be very 
low, ruling out the possibility of the processor becoming too busy, but the bandwidth 
resource will still be in jeopardy from such an attack.  
 
Access controls, from the perspective of this research does not fall in the application 
layer of the TCP/IP reference model and is thus beyond the scope of this work. The 
problem with access controls, specifically in the case of VoIP, is that one would like 
to be reachable by anyone on the Internet (the public). VPNs and other access 
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controls serve their purpose well for business applications stretching across large 
geographical areas where only some parties should have access. Although filtering, 
or rather temporarily blacklisting, MAC addresses is not a sufficient solution for 
VoIP, it could easily, and efficiently be implemented as the connection could be 
dropped with very little resources going to waste. A combination of some criteria 
such as MAC address, IP address, etcetera, would offer a much more secure 
solution, or an even better one - that randomly changes the combination of filtering 
criteria. One should, however, take great care not to deny service to legitimate users 
as a side effect of mitigating against these kinds of attacks. Such a setting would in 
itself produce a denial of service situation. 
 
4.3.5 Encryption 
 
4.3.5.1 Sniffing and encryption 
 
A sniffer is a device, or piece of software capable of monitoring information travelling 
across a network. They are virtually impossible to detect and can theoretically be 
inserted anywhere. The only two methods to prevent information from being 
intercepted is to use a protocol the sniffer does not understand; using IPX instead of 
TCP, for example, or to make use of encryption. Packet sniffers may also be used 
by attackers on a compromised machine. Its purpose could be to collect sensitive 
data that is sent out over the network, or retrieve usernames and passwords of all 
incoming logins to a server. 
 
Many authentication protocols make use of a process where the plaintext is hashed 
by the client, sent over the network, and each entry in the database is retrieved by 
the server and also hashed. The two hashes are then compared one-by-one with 
each other to validate authenticity as un-hashing would take far too long. VoIP‟s 
digitised data transmission can unfortunately not rely on the digitized voice being 
compared with a table, as the data can have far too many combinations to be 
efficient; it is not feasible to store this data in a table. It is therefore necessary to be 
 49 
able to decipher the encrypted audio when it is received by the remote host. VoIP 
therefore requires that the only secret is the key. The algorithm may be known, but 
each session needs to have a secret key, which if compromised would unfortunately 
compromise the secrecy of the conversation. 
 
Sniffers are especially effective with protocols that use clear text such as the File 
Transfer Protocol‟s (FTP) since the username and password can be read off the 
sniffer‟s logs. 
 
A sample application has been written in C# which allows two users to connect to 
each other and send text messages to each other. The user has an option to encrypt 
the data that is sent over the network or not. If the data is chosen to be encrypted, 
the user needs to specify a key with which the data is to be encrypted and 
decrypted. If the users are not using the same key, all the received messages are 
illegible. This is also true for someone using a sniffer. If the person using the sniffer 
does not know the algorithm and the key, he will not be able to understand the 
messages. 
  
As far as the encryption scheme‟s key generator is concerned, another well known 
weakness exists with random number generation. If for instance a key of 40-bits was 
to be generated by a random number generator, the randomness is often limited, 
and thus less secure than the length of the key itself suggests. 40 bits is supposed 
to generate 1099511627775 possible combinations for a key. 
 
The generator may be flawed in such a way that it actually is only capable of 
generating say only 100000000000 unique numbers. With this hypothetical case 
there are only 37 bits of randomness and the key strength is limited to that level of 
encryption strength. An estimate was that the average 128-bit session key for 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) contained only 47-bits of randomness. As the strength 
of the encryption is exponentially dependant on the (effective) key size, the status 
quo of decryption methodologies poses a severe threat to such flaws. For example, 
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an 11-bit key is twice as hard to break as a 10-bit key and a 20-bit key around one 
thousand times as difficult to break.  
 
A sample application was written in Java that selects a random number between 1 
and 10. The application generates 1000 random numbers and calculates how many 
times each number (between 1 and 10) was selected. In theory, each number 
should be selected 100 times (1000 / 10), but as the generator is random, one will 
have different results every time, but the closer the number is to 100, the better.  
 
4.3.5.2 Wireless encryption - WEP and WPA 
 
In [14] the vulnerabilities of commonly used wireless encryption technologies are 
discussed. The WPA-PSK (public switched key) protocol was found to be 
“crackable” on November 4, 2003. The method, as opposed to cracking WEP, is 
active rather than passive and is more easily detected. 
 
Different perceptions exist on how wireless devices should function. Two popular 
schools of thought are that wireless systems, especially access points, are devices 
with very limited computational power, (temporary) storage and bandwidth, and the 
contrary. These different perceptions‟ implementations will need different designs in 
order to perform optimally. This is especially true from a security viewpoint and the 
encryption strength. 
 
Tanenbaum noted in [13] that in the race between computation and networking, 
networking is far in the lead. The bottle neck is when the signals are converted 
(computation) from light to electricity and vice versa. Although this was said with 
fibre optics in mind, laser is also used in wireless applications with a transmission of 
the speed of light as well. 
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5 IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
 
Microsoft Access was used as a Database Management System (DBMS) for storing 
and querying all types of necessary data, as it is a flat file and not resource 
intensive. Java was used as the programming language, as it has built in support for 
the JET engine required to connect with the Microsoft Access database, and Java is 
designed with security and stability in mind. Buffer overflows are automatically ruled 
out when using Java, as runtime bounds checking is implemented into Java. Java is 
also widely supported across platforms. All the required libraries and data structures, 
such as linked list objects, are natively available in Java, except for a proper means 
of implementing a tray icon. JDIC (a binary distribution of a tray icon interface) [15] is 
freely available and is based on Swing, which is also native Java for the purpose of 
the tray icon. 
 
In the previous chapter, we investigated what causes all the vulnerabilities in the 
scope of this work, how they can be exploited, and what effect exploitation has. In 
this chapter we investigate possible measures which can be used to mitigate the 
risks regarding these vulnerabilities and we present the results of the wireless 
protocols investigated. It is important to emphasize that it is an absurd statement to 
advocate that a piece of software as completely secure as vulnerabilities derive from 
oversights, which is simply a flaw that was not anticipated. The software developed 
in this work is therefore designed with security in mind, but can under no 
circumstances be labelled as completely secure. 
 
5.1 Buffer Overflows 
Although Java has built-in support for preventing buffer overflows from occurring, 
it is crucial to point out what operations enable the overflowing of buffers in the C 
language, as buffer overflows are one of the most exploited vulnerabilities in 
practice. Several library functions are known to ignore bounds checking arrays 
(primarily because it is a performance trade-off) such as strcpy() and sprintf(). 
Additionally to avoiding the use of these functions, one should be careful as to 
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what operations are executed on buffers (as well as regular variables along with 
the usage of pointers) within the application. The following code snippet copies 
one array onto another, character by character, without bound checking the 
target array (it only checks for a delimiter in the source string which is used by 
the C language to terminate strings), which results in the buffer overflow 
vulnerability. 
 
while(*ptrBuff1 != ‘ \0’ ) 
{ 
 *ptrBuff2 = *ptrBuff1; 
 ptrBuff1++; 
 ptrBuff2++; 
} 
Figure 5.1 Buffer overflow vulnerable code 
 
Both the client and server sockets of the previously implemented VoIP system 
have been tested for handling abruptly large buffers with the intent to overrun 
them, but because Java is interpreted, and does bounds checking at runtime, it 
did not disrupt the programme from normal execution. Upon receiving the large 
buffer, an error was raised, the overflow of the buffer was ignored and normal 
execution resumed. The following figures show the results obtained. 
 
 53 
 
Figure 5.2 Text file used as payload 
 
Firstly, the above text file was created to overflow the buffer. This file starts with 
the string “/dlg”, which is interpreted by the VoIP application as a text message 
that should be displayed in a popup window and the end of the text file is 
delimited with “xyz---”, which will be used as proof that the payload is indeed 
larger than the buffer, and that it should overflow if the vulnerability exists. We 
used the Windows port of netcat (nc.exe) to pipe the contents of the text file to 
the socket of the VoIP application by issuing the command in Figure 5.3 below: 
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Figure 5.3 Using netcat to attempt overflowing the buffer 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, no segmentation fault occurred when the payload 
was sent to the application. Fig 5.4 below shows the popup window that was 
output by sending the payload, which proves that a larger payload was sent to 
the application, as the terminating string from the text file ended in “xyz---”, but 
the popup message ended in “xyz-”. The last two characters of the payload (“--”) 
were simply truncated without causing a segmentation violation. 
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Figure 5.4 The received popup message 
 
When receiving a larger packet than compensated for, the default mechanism of 
the DatagramPacket class constructor is to truncate everything after the offset 
specified by its length parameter.  
 
5.2 Brute Force 
An effective and a widely used solution could be to set timeouts on usernames. If 
a user wishes to log in, for example, but specifies an incorrect password, the 
user‟s account is temporarily disabled. Obviously, the longer the period of the 
disabling, the longer an attacker would take to successfully brute force the 
username and password, but one should take into consideration that humans are 
error prone and might enter their usernames and passwords incorrectly, and lock 
out their own accounts. Alternatively, a malicious user could enter wrong 
passwords for a known username on purpose to have the account locked out. 
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This is why the time which an account is locked out should be decided on very 
carefully. 
 
Let us consider a scenario where a malignant attacker knows the username of 
someone, and wants to brute force his account. Let us say that the attacker 
knows that the password consists of a single alphabetical character (a through to 
z), as the hypothetical password policy is enforced this way. Knowing this, the 
attacker may narrow down the number of possible passwords to 26. If the 
scenario (processor speed and network resource availability) allowed him to 
attempt one password per second, he would be able to crack any password 
under half a minute. If, however, the system decides to disable the account for 
one minute after each incorrect attempt, the attacker would in the worst case be 
able to crack it just under half an hour. This effect is exponentially more visible as 
the time which the account is disabled increases as well as better password 
policies are enforced. This solution could render brute force attacks completely 
unfeasible. 
 
An alternative mechanism for dealing with brute force attacks was implemented 
by tweaking the SQL injection demonstration programme. Figure 5.5 shows a 
screenshot of the example. 
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Figure 5.5 User interface of the brute force demonstration 
 
The system keeps track of every unsuccessful attempt made to guess the password 
of the given username (“Username”). When the number of unsuccessful attempts is 
more than a preset number (in this case 3), logging into the specific user‟s account 
is disabled until the value representing the number attempts is changed to a number 
lower than 3. As was stated earlier some field is monitored to be repetitive, while 
another changes. In this case the account is locked on the grounds that a specific 
account (based on a username) has numerous password attempts. 
 
5.3 SQL Injections 
As for code injections, and particularly SQL injections, all possible input from the 
user, including, but not limited to all information arriving over the network, should  
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be scrutinised for special delimiters such as single quotes for SQL injections and 
appropriate countermeasures should be taken. Since these special characters 
may appear naturally and validly in some cases, especially in the digitized audio 
as well as conversational text messages, the policy should be refined to fit the 
purpose of the input. There is no sense in delimiting special characters that are 
not evaluated in databases or which may not form part of an SQL query (such as 
usernames and passwords) to the database. 
 
An application was written in Visual Basic 6, to demonstrate SQL injection 
vulnerability. The application presents a typical login screen with a username and 
password field. The application fails to remove, or delimit, special characters 
such as the single quote („). It is possible to successfully log into the application 
without knowing the username and password. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The SQL injection vulnerable application 
 
 59 
The following pseudo-function is suggested to make the application invulnerable 
to SQL injections: 
 
void Addslashes(string var) 
{ 
 foreach (char character in var) 
 if (character == “‟ ”) 
  character = “\‟ ”; 
} 
Figure 5.7 Addslashes function 
 
Whenever a single quote is identified, the character is delimited by a “\”. SQL 
injections were thus eliminated at the obvious level. As most vulnerabilities are 
unintended errors, and overlooked, we cannot say that the implemented system 
is completely immune against SQL injections. This is even more important when 
other vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited in a combination to 
successfully accomplish the desired exploitation result. The suggested method is 
a common methodology to handle SQL injections in web applications and 
particularly PHP (although there is no official full name for PHP, a common one 
is “Professional Home Pages”) applications before adding the string to an 
executed SQL statement. This effectively includes the single quote in the data, 
without having it be parsed as a string separation token. 
 
5.4 Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service (DoS and DDoS) 
Preventing or recovering from a distributed denial of service attack is a complex 
issue, as it is difficult to distinguish between the perpetrators and legitimate 
users, which may require manual intervention. Best practice suggests tearing 
down the connection and freeing up resources as soon as it has been 
determined that a malignant attack is taking place. New TCP/UDP connections 
could be rejected, even before the three way handshake has taken place to 
ensure that as few as possible resources are devoted to the culprits. A serious 
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problem with this approach is that the grounds on which the user is blacklisted 
(as in username, IP address, MAC address, etcetera) may prevent legitimate 
users from making use of the service. 
 
Denial of service as well as distributed denial of service attacks are difficult to 
automatically detect and is often best solved by manual intervention [25]. An 
administrator would typically search for a pattern (such as every computer in the 
distributed denial of service attack is downloading the same file, which makes it 
relatively safe to assume that everyone downloading the file are involved) which 
is often difficult to anticipate. Anticipation of certain patterns is an insufficient 
measure, as security should not be enforced through obscurity, which leaves the 
attacker free to search for any unanticipated pattern. In the event of a distributed 
denial of service attack, an administrator may typically prevent all IPs involved 
from routing to the source of contention. Such a solution does not lie in a single 
layer of the OSI model, and cannot be handled most efficiently in the application 
layer, as lower layers would save more resources. 
 
To demonstrate an IP address filtering scheme, the DoS.exe programme was 
developed. The results are presented in Figure 5.8 and 5.9. 
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Figure 5.8 A blocked connection attempt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 An accepted connection attempt 
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The first screenshot shows a blocked connection attempt. The server (DoS.exe) 
was listening on port 1000 and 127.0.0.1 (which is the IP address for localhost) 
was blocked. When a telnet connection was made to the server socket, it was 
immediately disconnected, as the server detected that the connection request 
was coming from the IP address being blocked. 
 
In Figure 5.9, however, the connection attempt was accepted, as the IP address 
being blocked by the server was not equal to the source of the connection 
request (127.0.0.1).  
 
5.5 Encryption 
 
5.5.1 Sniffing and encryption strength 
Encryption was not implemented into the VoIP application, and was separated 
from this as the encryption demonstration was implemented as a separate stand 
alone C# application. Here is an intercepted message, as well as its plaintext 
counterpart:  
 
Intercepted data (string representation) Plaintext Message 
?,!t0&i.>a6<'*8&.l%2=&t40:<1&6j This is an example text message. 
Figure 5.10 Demonstrating encrypted data 
 
This application uses a simple method of encryption. The XOR operator is simply 
used on the payload along with a key. Although unintelligible, there are much 
stronger algorithms for encryption that should be used. From this data it is clear 
that when encryption is enabled, the messages are unintelligible. The digitized 
audio should also be encrypted, although it is difficult to illustrate it as text, as 
they are byte arrays. Figure 5.11 demonstrates the user interface of the 
encryption example: 
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Figure 5.11 Encryption example 
 
Keys are usually based on random number generators, which as was said earlier 
may influence the key strength. The randomness of the random number 
generator has been tested (which will be discussed below) and is given in Fig 
5.12: 
 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Frequency 959 1013 989 999 1073 934 1082 1023 980 948 
Figure 5.12 Random number generator 
 
The data in Figure 5.12 was gathered from having chosen a random number 
between 1 and 10 for 10 000 iterations. The frequency denotes how many times 
the specific number (between 1 and 10) was chosen. It is evident from the data 
above that the numbers are fairly random. Although not precisely divided into 
each value, the frequency a number was randomly generated is roughly equal. 
Take note that the data generated differs when the application is executed again, 
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or a new set of data is generated. The range of possible values (1-10) should be 
increased radically, desirably to fit the size of the key that will be used. 
 
5.5.2 Wireless Security 
 
The wireless protocol‟s security has been evaluated by driving around in the 
cities of Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Kimberley with a Senao 802.11 b/g 
PCMCIA with a built in Antenna, probing for networks as well as their attributes 
and plotting them on a map. The security levels of WEP and WPA have already 
been found to be insufficient [26]. Although security can be enforced (more 
effectively) at other layers, it is better to apply secure practice in as many layers 
as possible. By taking into account the small amount of administrative work 
involved in applying encryption to a wireless network, it is well worth it, even if it 
can be broken into within five minutes. 
 
Many of the discovered nodes have default settings applied to them. Some 
manufacturers attempted to lighten the burden of setting up their equipment, in 
particular access points, for users by having defaults that work out of the box. 
From a support point of view, this is valuable, but from a security viewpoint, it is 
very bad practice. Users tend to accept defaults, and happily accept their 
circumstances when the device is working. Malicious attackers knowing this 
could easily compromise these devices. Some of the SSIDS one should look out 
for are the ones that are named after the manufacturer‟s name such as Linksys, 
Netgear, Gigabyte and 3com. Marconi is another frequently detected SSID in 
South Africa. They are (by default) routers bundled by Telkom with ADSL 
Internet subscriptions. Apart from most often being on default settings, they are 
vulnerable to other attacks. These routers are even accessible from the Internet, 
which means that an attacker could easily get access to many of these if an 
attack was launched against Telkom‟s whole IP range. Apparently, after some 
abuse, Telkom fixed the problem with their new routers and also prevented 
administrative access to the router from the wireless side. Although this 
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weakness was mostly exploited to gain additional bandwidth as Internet 
expenses are very high in South Africa, the problem could have been much 
worse as these since prime locations to insert data loggers as all traffic passes 
through the routers. Sensitive information such as banking details could have 
been acquired in the masses. 
 
The table below depicts the total amount of wireless nodes found, the number 
using no encryption at all, the number which uses WEP, the number that uses 
WPA and the number that use WPA2 in Bloemfontein, Kimberley and Pretoria. 
The total number of wireless nodes found in each city does not reflect the entire 
population. Kimberley and Pretoria, especially have fewer nodes, as much less 
time was spent scanning for nodes.  
 
 Total Open WEP WPA WPA2 
Bloemfontein 326 161 127 4 34 
Kimberley 105 57 43 0 5 
Pretoria 141 69 58 1 13 
Figure 5.13 Encryption methodologies used in the gathered data 
 
The method and further details used to gather the above information is given 
below: 
 
As mentioned, the wireless card used was a Senao High Speed PCMCIA 
Adapter - b/g - 108Mbps, which is based on the Atheros chipset and has good 
Linux device driver support (manual installation is however required for free 
software such as openSuSe as a result of licensing issues). Although the 108 
Mbps is overrated, as it can only be accomplished with two cards joined together 
as one. Omni directional antennae generally work better than directional 
antennae; unfortunately the card with the built in antenna was all that was 
available for the tests. The November release of the Back Track 2 Public Beta 
Live CD (a CD bootable Linux distribution designed for penetration testing and 
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based on Slackware Linux) was attempted to be used on a Sony Vaio VGN-
FE38GP laptop. Unfortunately, there was an issue with the built in wireless 
network card, and the operating system did not boot up. In order to determine the 
geographic location of the wireless networks and ultimately plot them on a map, 
a Garmin GPSmap 60 Global Positioning System (GPS) device was used. The 
GPSmap60 was used primarily for its ease of use and support of the NMEA 
protocol, which is a prerequisite for most GPS devices to communicate properly 
with gpsd (a daemon interfacing with GPS devices and making the 
communications available through a network socket). Unfortunately, only after 
the acquisition of the device did it become apparent that the NMEA protocol only 
operates over the device‟s serial cable interface, not over Universal Serial Bus 
(USB). Since the notebook in use neither has a serial adapter nor does the GPS 
device come with its serial cable packaged, much time was spent getting the 
device to work in conjunction with gpsd over the USB cable. The only solution 
that worked was to use SuSe Linux 10.0 along with kismet and gpsd. Apparently 
it is a not-so-well-known bug that gpsd does not work too well with the 
combination of USB devices and newer kernels (the exact same packages of 
gpsd and kismet where used with open SuSe 10.2 with no success). It is said 
that the problem lies in the way USB devices are handled with newer kernels 
(/dev/ttyUSB). 
 
Kismet is an application that has the capability of monitoring wireless networks 
by logging many of the wireless networks‟ properties and attributes such as 
signal strength, location, SSID, Number of clients, etc. See the kismet homepage 
(www.kismet-wireless.org ) for more information. By having the wireless NIC in 
monitor mode, Kismet collects information of all the wireless networks in its 
presence, such as ESSID, BSSID, the channel used, whether it is cloaked or not, 
the type of encryption used, whether it has been decrypted yet, and some GPS 
information to describe each node‟s location. This information, along with some 
additional information, which will be described in detail later, is then stored in log 
files. These logs can be converted to a Google Earth compatible format by using 
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KNSgem. Thereafter, the nodes are displayed on the satellite photos of Google 
Earth. Unfortunately, some sections of Google Earth’s maps are obtained from 
different organisations. This, along with some sort of flaw with the pattern 
matching software Google Earth uses, makes sections of the map inaccurate. 
For example, the southern centre landmark can be seen twice on the map. The 
Google Earth compatible files (.kml) are included on the disk. One can, after 
installing Google Earth, open Google Earth and simply double click the 
“_Knsgem_Master.kml” file. Google Earth will “fly to” for an overview of the 
Bloemfontein area and a yellow dot will be located more or less towards the 
centre of the screen. Thereafter, one can right-click on the dot (see Figure 5.15) 
and select the log (sorted by date) to be opened. The screenshot below shows 
the yellow dot on the map: 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Google Earth 
 
The image below (Figure 5.16) shows a section of the Westdene area which is 
rich in small businesses with some of the plotted nodes: 
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Figure 5.16 Google Earth Westdene area 
 
It is obvious when viewing the map that there are inaccuracies. For example, 
some nodes are pictured within the water at Loch Logan Waterfront, and the 
Western curve Paul Kruger makes in Universitas is reflected by the detected 
nodes, but an incorrect offset (in accordance to the satellite photographs) is 
present. What percentages of the accuracy error are owing to the incorrect 
mapping or owing to flaws in the method (obstacles may influence the plotting 
accuracy) still remains unresolved. 
 
The data gathered in Kimberley was done using Network Stumbler. Network 
Stumbler unfortunately, at this stage, does not have built in support for GPS 
devices over USB. Therefore it is not plotted as with the other data. 
 
The commands are listed below: 
 
# iwconfig ath0 mode monitor  Puts the NIC in RF-Monitor mode 
# kismet 
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Some APs contain NICs. They are typically composed of PC board with an open 
slot (in some cases several slots) for PCMCIA cards. The ones with external 
antenna slots have these connectors on the PCMCIA card. The operating 
systems of the AP as well as data settings are stored on a chip on the board. It 
therefore makes sense that these cards can be put in the otherwise rather 
strange modes such as AP mode with a tool such as iwconfig, which is the 
wireless version of ifconfig – a common Linux console tool. See the manual 
pages of iwconfig for more details. 
 
The weakness of the WEP protocol lies in IV leaking out and can be deciphered 
by statistical mathematics. Kismet, Airsnort and Aircrack are the most popular 
tools that accomplish this. The WPA protocol can be deciphered with coWPAtty.  
 
5.6 The Applications’ user interfaces 
 
The VoIP application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17 The VoIP application 
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Rootkit 
A rootkit was also developed in C, which spawns a shell which can be used to 
execute commands on a remote machine. The protocol is mimicking FTP in 
order not to draw suspicion. 
 
 
Figure 5.18 Rootkit 
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Trojan 
 
Figure 5.18 the Trojan GUI without the hidden functionality 
 
This Trojan is a good example of how innocent an application may look to a user. 
The true purpose of the application can only be seen once the network traffic is 
analysed or the source code is reviewed (with Windows binaries this is a rather 
daunting task as decompiling and interpreting the assembly code is trivial). 
 
With this application a user can strike the F12 key which brings up the following 
dialogue box: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19 The Trojan password prompt 
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If the correct password is entered (in this case “Password”), the user is 
presented with much more functionality, as can be seen on the following 
screenshot. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 The Trojan GUI with hidden functionality 
 
5.7 Summary 
To summarise, we present the following code to serve as an example of the 
multitude of attack vectors that can be implemented against a few flawed lines of 
code. Consider the following pseudo code which is basically a possible method 
of FTP authentication: 
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if (left$(packetReceived,8) == “220 User”) {  
 if (fetchUsernameFromDB(right$(packetReceived, 8)) == true) 
  correctuser = true; 
 if (correctUser == true) 
  sendPasswordRequired(); 
 else 
  sendIncorrectLogin(); 
} 
elseif (left$(packetReceived, 4) == “Pass”) {  
if (correctUser == true && fetchPasswordFromDB(right$(packetReceived, 4))  
== true) 
userAuthenticated(); 
else 
 sendIncorrectLogin(); 
} 
Figure 5.21 Multiple vulnerabilities example code 
 
The preceding code examines a received packet to determine what was 
requested by the client. It firstly checks whether the packet was intended to 
identify the client with a username; if so, the database is queried with the 
supplied username, and the client is informed whether a correct username was 
supplied. If the packet was not a username submission, execution flow continues 
to check whether a password has been submitted instead, in which case the 
password is checked for in the database, and confirms if the previously supplied 
username was in fact a correct username. Again, the client is notified 
accordingly. After careful examination of the code, one might conclude that the 
code is vulnerable to an SQL injection (depending on how the usernames and 
passwords are handled in function calls). Besides that, the code introduces bad 
practice on username and password notification. Most modern applications are 
aware of this „vulnerability‟ and respond with a “You supplied a valid username, 
please supply a password” response regardless of whether the username was 
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correct or not. This dramatically increases the number of tries or guesses the 
attacker has to make in order to receive notification that something is correct – 
both the username and password need to be correct in order to be sure a 
username is in fact registered in the system (valid). 
 
An obvious vulnerability that was missed with the code above as well is that the 
username and password were not treated as a combination. The logic is flawed 
since any correct username, as well as any correct password will result in 
successful authentication. The username does not require its own matching 
password. This also drastically decreases the number of possibilities (especially 
in the case where there are many usernames and passwords in the database) to 
the benefit of a brute force attack. 
 
If the code was adjusted to reply positively to the client on a username 
submission, regardless of whether it is in fact valid, closer examination of the 
code reveals yet another possible weakness. An attacker may code an 
application that understands the authentication process of the protocol along with 
some added functionality. Additional to authentication the application maintains a 
timer and a log of measured response times from the server. Every time the 
attacker guesses an incorrect password the response time may vary minimally. 
Conversely, if the attacker guesses a correct username, the amount of time 
again may vary, but on average (of a few attempts) correct usernames are 
responded to in a longer time segment.  This happens because an extra 
instruction is executed (line 3), along with passing some database parameters 
and so forth. Resource availability may drastically influence and most probably 
distort results of the attacker, but on the other hand the attacker might be aware 
that the system load is very low at a specific time of day, for example, and launch 
his attack accordingly. 
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From the vulnerabilities discussed above, it is apparent that a vast number of 
things could go wrong. Developers need to be fully aware of what their code 
really does, and forget what they think it does, or what they want it to do. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 
Both VoIP and wireless networking are relatively new technologies. All new 
technologies tend to take time before they are implemented to satisfactory 
standards. Furthermore, security‟s worst enemy is additional features. These two 
factors have drastically detrimental trade-offs. Probably the largest problem with 
wireless networking is the feature that it should be able to support re-association of 
a client and a different access point in the network. The problems exponentially 
escalate as soon as a work-around is devised. It therefore makes sense that 
different standards are implemented, that is 802.11 and 802.16, as different 
problems are attempted to be solved. The 802.11 standard has a stronger focus on 
mobility (disassociation and re-association) whereas 802.16 does not attempt this 
and therefore accommodates a stronger focus on security. 
 
The most common security flaws for VoIP over wireless networks were examined 
along with viable solutions. The objectives of this work were mainly to describe the 
details of what cause the vulnerabilities, and how they can be solved, as awareness 
is the key to developing a secure system. The vulnerabilities within the scope of this 
work were fully explained by means of what the causes are, what effect exploitation 
has, as well as how they can be mitigated. 
 
A difficulty that was experienced is that all of these vulnerabilities may appear in 
almost any section of the code of the entire programme. Since this opens a myriad 
of new conditions that should be compensated for, the code may grow more than 
two-fold for a working, secure VoIP system. As larger pieces of code opens even 
more possibilities of oversight errors, securing VoIP systems seems an unattainable 
feat. 
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Security is often approached on the basis of the systems development life cycle. 
The reason for this is that security is never achieved; it rather is a continuous 
process of risk analysis (which constantly changes along with the company‟s internal 
and external environment), mitigation and acceptance. It is both senseless and 
unprofitable for a business to mitigate a risk which realistically would never come to 
pass. On the other hand financial and military institutions need excellent security as 
they are much more prone to attacks. 
 
The worst problem with security is that the vulnerabilities arise from oversight errors. 
This is the main reason why we addressed each problem separately, in order to 
completely explain and ensure in depth knowledge of some of the problems that 
security professionals face. Implicitly, this approach also revealed some 
weaknesses. The in depth study of the vulnerabilities imposed time restrictions on 
developing a complete, secure system on which tests could be done. There are also 
many other types of vulnerabilities that have not been studied. Developers should be 
encouraged to take considerable conditions into account. 
 
In 2003 when WEP was proven beyond doubt to be “crackable” the Internet 
Engineering Task Force made it known that the next standard will be much more 
secure, and that WEP was not intended to be invincible. As the name states: Wired 
Equivalent Privacy, wired networks do not have much privacy, except for physical 
access restriction. A large factor influencing the successful maintenance of security 
is training. As Kevin Mutnick said, the user is the weakest link in security [11]. 
 
6.2 Future Work 
 
Future work may include studying the other common vulnerabilities, field tests on 
new wireless technologies, such as WiMAX and UMTS/WCDMA. A working system 
could be developed and tested for vulnerabilities. There are also code scanners 
available that scan code for known vulnerabilities before compiling, which could be 
used to aid in developing the system. 
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Furthermore, a system could be developed that allows for calls to be made over a 
NAT enabled network. This would require a server on the network that is reachable 
by all hosts and directs all calls. However, great care should be taken to guard 
against DoS attacks in such a setup and in-depth research should be conducted on 
the matter. 
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6 Gevolgtrekking en verdere navorsing 
 
6.1 Gevolgtrekking 
 
Beide VoIP en koordlose netwerke is relatief nuwe tegnologieë.  Alle nuwe 
tegnologieë neig om tyd op te neem alvorens dit volgens bevredigend standaarde 
geïmplementeer kan word. Verdermeer, is sekuriteit se grootste vyand is 
addisionele funksionaliteite. Hierdie twee faktore beïnvloed mekaar drasties. Die 
probleem eskaleer eksponensieel sodra omleidings ontwikkel word. Dit is gevolglik 
sinvol dat verskillende standaarde geïmplementeer word byvoorbeeld 802.11 en 
802.16, in ‟n poging om verskillende probleme op te los. Die 802.11 standaard het „n 
sterker fokus op mobiliteit dissosiasie en herassosiasie  terwyl 802.16 nie so sterk 
op mobiliteit afgestem is nie.  Gevolglik bied dit beter sekuriteit. 
 
Die mees algemene sekuriteitsleemtes vir VoIP via koordlose netwerke is 
geëvalueer met lewensvatbare oplossings. Gesien in die lig dat waaksaamheid die 
sleutel is tot die ontwikkling van ‟n sekure sisteem, was dit die doelwit van hierdie 
studie om in hoofsaak die eienskappe te beskryf  wat verantwoordelik is vir 
kwesbaarheid en hoe om dit op te los. Die kwesbaarhede binne die reikwydte van 
hierdie studie was volledig verduidelik: Die oorsake, die impak van  uitbuiting en 
metodes om dit te verlig. 
 
„n Dilemma wat ondervind was, is die feit dat al die genoemde kwesbaarhede in 
bykans enige afdeling van die kode van die algehele program kan voorkom. 
Aangesien dit „n veelheid van nuwe geleenthede meebring waarvoor daar 
gekompenseer moet word, vergroot die kode meer as dubbelvoudig vir die werking 
van ‟n sekure VoIP sisteem. Aangesien bonkige kodes selfs meer moontlikhede vir 
oorsig-foute meebring, blyk die opskerping van sekuriteit vir VoIP sisteme 
onhaalbaar. 
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Sekuriteit word dikwels gebaseer op die sisteme lewenssiklus. Die rede hiervoor is 
dat sekuriteit nie ‟n afgekapselde eindpunt bereik nie. Dit is eerder ‟n konstante 
proses van risiko-analise (vanweë die konstante veradering van die maatskapy se 
interne en eksterne milieu). Dit is beide sinloos en ook onekonomies vir ‟n besigheid 
om risiko‟s wat realisties gesproke nooit sal manifesteer nie, te probeer bekamp. 
Aan die anderkant benodig finansiële en militêre instansies wel uitstekende 
sekuriteit gesien in die lig dat hulle groter teikens vir infiltrasie is. 
 
Die grootste probleem met sekuriteit is dat swakplekke as gevolg van oorsig-foute 
ontstaan. Dit is die hoof-rede waarom hierdie studie elke probleem afsonderlik 
aanspreek, ten einde elk breedvoerig te verduidelik en indiepte kennis te verseker 
van sommige van die probleme waaraan sekuriteitslui aandag moet skenk. Implisiet 
het hierdie benadering ook sommige leemtes uitgewys. Die indiepte studie van die 
swakhede het  ‟n tydsbeperking geplaas op die ontwikkeling van ‟n volledige sekure 
sisteem, waarop toetse gedoen kon word. Daar is ook baie ander tipes 
kwesbaarhede wat nie bestudeer is nie. Ontwikkellaars moet aangemoedig word om 
„n substansiële hoeveelheid  omstandighede in berekening te bring. 
 
In 2003 is bo alle twyfel bewys dat  WEP indringbaar is.  Internet ingenieurs het 
bekend gemaak dat die volgende standaard baie meer sekuur sal wees, en dat 
WEP nie daarop toegespits was om ondeurdringbaar te wees nie. Soos die term 
“Wireless Equivalency Privacy” aandui, het bedrade netwerke nie veel 
konfidensialiteit nie behalwe vir die fisiese beperking wat daar op  toegang gestel 
word. 
 
„n Belangrike faktor wat die suksekvolle instandhouding van sekuriteit beïnvloed, is 
opleiding. Kevin Mutnick het gesê dat die gebruiker die swakste skakel in sekuriteit 
is. [11]  
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6.2 Toekomstige Navorsing 
 
Toekomsnavorsing kan gedoen word oor ander algemene kwesbaarhede en veld-
navorsing oor nuwe koordlose tegnologieë, soos WiMax en UMTS/WCDMA. „n 
Werkende sisteem kan ontwikkel en getoets word vir kwesbaarhede. Daar is ook 
kode-skandeerders beskikbaar vir die voorafskandering vir kwesbaarhede alvorens 
inbruikneming van „n sisteem. 
 
 „n Sisteem kan ook ontwikkel word wat oproepe oor ‟n NAT netwerk kan maak. Dit 
vra om „n bediener op die netwerk wat vir alle kliënte bereikbaar is en alle oproepe 
kan herlei / kanaliseer. Dit moet egter streng gewaak word teen DoS aanvalle in 
sodanige opstelling en indiepte-navorsing moet in die verband onderneem word. 
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8 Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
char shellcode[] = 
 "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" 
 "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" 
 "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; 
 
void function() { 
 char buffer1[5]; 
 char buffer2[10]; 
 int *ret; 
 
 ret = &buffer1[5]; 
 ret += 2; 
 (*ret) = (int)&shellcode; 
 printf("buffer1 = %x \nret = %x\nbuffer1[4] = %x\n", buffer1, ret,&buffer1[4]); 
  
} 
 
void main() { 
 function(); 
} 
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Appendix B 
 
Private Sub chkSQL_Click() 
    If chkSQL.Value Then 
            lblSQL.Visible = True 
            Call calcSQL 
    Else 
            lblSQL.Visible = False 
    End If 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub cmdLogin_Click() 
    On Error Resume Next 
    Dim strSQL As String 
    Dim conDB  As ADODB.Connection 
    Dim rsUser As New ADODB.Recordset 
     
    Set conDB = New ADODB.Connection 
    Set rsUser = New ADODB.Recordset 
         
    conDB.ConnectionString = "Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;Data Source=" & 
App.Path & "\UsersDB.mdb;Persist Security Info=False" 
    conDB.Open 
    strSQL = "SELECT * FROM tblUsers WHERE Username = '" & txtUser.Text & _ 
    "' AND UserPassword = '" & txtPassword.Text & "';" 
     
    With rsUser 
        .CursorLocation = adUseClient 
        .Open strSQL, conDB, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic ', adCmdText 
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        If .EOF And .BOF Then 
            MsgBox "Wrong username & password" 
        Else 
            MsgBox "Correct" 
        End If 
    End With 
     
End Sub 
 
Private Sub txtPassword_Change() 
    Call calcSQL 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub txtUser_Change() 
    Call calcSQL 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub calcSQL() 
    If chkSQL.Value Then 
        lblSQL.Caption = "SELECT * FROM tblUsers WHERE Username = '" & 
txtUser.Text & _ 
    "' AND UserPassword = '" & txtPassword.Text & "';" 
    End If 
End Sub 
 
